[Adm.Lee]

I've been thinking more about this, since we opened the question of post-OMEGA Poland. So, a little thread-necromancy here....

In Going Home, the Third German Army has practically abandoned the eastern frontier. What's up with that? There's only 1 division in contact (as I would consider it), the rest, including III Corps HQ, have pulled back to the west and north. The British pulled out from around Berlin, too.

For that matter, why is XI Corps pinned where it is? There are no Pact or even German units between them and Kiel.

I just re-read most of the above posts. I think Legbreaker is onto something with the "more mobile Polish cavalry." We've mostly all agreed that the appearance of the Fourth Guards Tank Army with diesel in its tanks was a shock. What if the wholesale mounting of those Polish & Soviet troops on horses was another shock? Or more specifically, the mobility those troopers obtained against the mechanized NATO forces? We have read that both Third German Army and 5th US Mechanized Division had a stop-and-go movement pattern for brewing, something they had probably become accustomed to since 1998 or '99. But formations that could ride circles around them on the days they were halted? Bands of riders that could appear to shoot up unarmored vehicle columns? That's scary.

So, what if we are looking at a command failure, or a series of the same? The commanding generals of III German and XI US Corps are blindsided by this new Pact mobility in their area, and Third German Army is surprised by both the Soviet offensive south of Berlin and the reports of the Guards with real fuel coming up through the Soviet rear.
Let's jack up the tension. Say there are just a few, a very few, sorties by Pact jets at this time. Another "impossible" feat. If the Soviets could put together diesel to get a tank army from Romania to Poland, why not a flight of MiGs, dropping down on an undefended HQ? Or a missile strike-- nuclear, biological or chemical? Then maybe one or more of the commanders that started the offensive isn't the one around at the end. Some work by Spetsnaz or even an unlucky brush with marauders could do the same.


For that matter, some here have questioned the plan that sent the 5th and 8th Mech divisions helter-skelter across Poland. Or even an offensive in Poland at all, given the conditions in the spring of 2000? Was CG Third Army in his right mind? Really? (If he isn't what does that say about his staff?) How might the command that issues the orders for the, let's say grandiose, offensive of 2000 react when it is evident that the enemy has more mobile forces than he does? If Army command gets confused and the Corps commanders are beleaguered by the Pact, I can see things melting away to what I outlined above. If the Army commander isn't nuts, maybe the XI Corps staff might stage a coup when they find out that two of their divisions just drove away (probably with most of the reserve fuel) on nebulous one-way missions. That would certainly set up some command paralysis.
The German III Corps pulls back in the absence of coherent orders from Army. By November, its divisions are mostly up in the far north of Germany. The US XI Corps is feeling very abandoned, both by its neighbor corps and by the Army HQ that stuck it out on a limb, with two of its divisions even further out. Maybe the command is feeling abandoned even by USAREUR, who attached them to the Germans in the first place, and then ordered everyone else home. Were there bad personal feelings among the commanders before the attack? I bet there are now.

So, like Webstral's profile of General Thomason, here's my attempt to get into the head of three other commanding generals (or more, if one or more of them were replaced in the campaign). I hope it's clear.