Quote:
Originally Posted by Legbreaker
It could be that the infantry component was foot mobile, or carried in wagons. Heavy equipment such as artillery, and stores could be transported by ox carts - slow, but as they're not expected to scoot quickly around a battlefield, probably sufficient.
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True they could transported by wagon or even foot mobile if they were ox to move equipment and supplies could keep up for protection of the Divisional Trains.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Legbreaker
It's possible that the Germans also had to give up a large amount of the fuel reserve to the Marines to get them out of the delta. This too may have contributed to the abbrievated offensive - no fuel means no point (or ability) to continue forward. I lean towards this scenario as it explains why a German Leopard III is part of the US 2nd MARDIV in October 2000 (it was security for one of the fuel resupply collumns).
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Yes if it would explain it somewhat. Also couple other twist is the German Leopard III represents an advance guard moving forward, in order to scout ahead so the III German Corps could leap frog the XI US Corps and/or the fuel assets that were brought forward were underestimated and at this point the 8th Mechanized and 2nd Marine divided up with the 8th taking what it needed for it next couple leg of their journey and the 2nd Marine was bringing back what was needed to keep the XI US Corps mobile.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Legbreaker
Even with the resupply, I see XI Corps as being extremely short on fuel. This lack of fuel results in them being forced into generally static positions and allows the Polish Cavalry to run rings around them. The Ples might not be strong enough to inflict a decisive defeat over the XI Corps, but they're certainly able to contain them.
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I think you hit the nail directly on the head the first time here. Both sides had seen that their limitation on fuel allowed the Cavalry to keep them pin. The Soviets/NATO Divisional Commanders on up, all along the line in Germany after hearing how effective the that Cavalry units had been during the operation and realizing the 5th Mechanized was only destroyed where it was due lack of fuel during the summer. Then if you accept that the NATO had shipped supplies via sea including fuel intended to keep the Third German Army components moving, and when it was destroyed things feel apart. I would believe that many of the loyal Soviet units unwilling to take on action would be due to believing they had fuel to do what higher HQ wanted them to do and still be mobile once they got there.
Like stated there was extreme learning curve during this operation. Probably the first NATO Army/Pact Front size operation in Europe since 1998, more than likely since then end of 1997. I see most operation in 1998 after the last of the major fuel stockpile for NATO being conducted at Corps and Divisional level to get their units in better defended positions but nothing larger since it is realize they don't have resources to do so. On the Soviet side their lack of an effective supply chain is showing. Spare parts don't exist and fuel comes in trickle if at all, while they are able to get new conscripts they then need to take time to train them, and then secure food to feed these new troops too. Desertion would raise sharply in the Soviet units due to lack of supplies, so they units start to revert back to what they had done before the war to survive. Raise crops in their area where they at.