Thread: Iraq
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Old 02-03-2010, 03:19 AM
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sglancy12 sglancy12 is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus View Post
The Soviet Union of v1.0 canon and the Soviet Union of 1990 (IRL) are not one in the same, at least not in my book
I'm not trying to say that. But I am willing to argue that the Soviet Union of v1 canon isn't going to be any more successful at reining in Saddam than anyone else.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus View Post
As to Saddam not backing down, IRL, he did not have the full weight of the [former] Eastern Bloc leaning on him. The "Soviet Union's" response to Saddam's aggression in 1991 was fairly ambivalent. If a more powerful Soviet Union- like the one in the v1.0 canon- and its satellites (i.e. the Warsaw Pact) were actively pressing him, he may have behaved more prudently.
I'm not saying the canon v1 USSR wouldn't have an interest in stopping Saddam from creating a situation that will get them embroiled in a conflict with the West. I'm just saying they wouldn't be able to stop him.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus View Post
True. This is why the Soviets tried to prevent Egypt from attacking Israel in '73
How, exactly, do you see this pressure being applied? What leverage does this canon v1 USSR have that the USSR in 1973 did not when they were dealing with Egypt?

You do have to admit that the Soviets didn't prevent the Egyptians from attacking Israel. All they succeeded in doing wad getting their advisers kicked out of Egypt. Ultimately that helped move Egypt from the Soviet camp to the US camp. It is an example of Soviet inability to control their clients.

Furthermore, the avowed policy of Egypt was to win back the Sinai Peninsula by military force. From 1970-1973 the Soviets, under Brezhnev, knew this was coming. They participated directly with the Egyptians in the so-called War of Attrition over the Sinai Peninsula and even lost fighter pilots who were piloting Egyptian aircraft. They didn't want to sell Egypt their most advanced SAM missiles but Sadat threatened to resign and bring in someone more US-oriented and Brezhnev relented and sold them the SAMs.

Even worse, when Egypt got themselves completely backed into a corner the USSR had to come in and get embroiled in a confrontation with the US which led to the USSR having to back down after the US raised its nuclear defcon level.

So Egypt manipulated the USSR into arming them. Kicked the Soviet advisers out. Attacked Israel against the Sov's wishes. Completely screwed up and then whined to the USSR which got the Sovs into exactly the kind of situation they were trying to avoid.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus View Post
and why the Soviet Union [of canon] might very well exert much stronger diplomatic and economic pressure on Saddam to back down and pull out of Kuwait. In this case, the Soviets would put a lot of pressure on Iraq, in part to demonstrate to the world that they can control their clients and, in part, to try to stabilize the region.
The problem I have with your analysis is that I just don't understand who you think this Soviet Union of the v1 canon is. What I mean is, if the powerful Soviet union of 1973 (maybe the pinnacle of Soviet power and prestige), under the leadership of an old Bolshevik like Brehznev, couldn't control Egypt when they had three years of warning... then who are these v1 canon Soviets?

With Saddam the USSR gets no warning. No one did. He just acted on his own without consulting anyone... besides some oblique and frankly dissembling questioning of US Abassador Glaspie... how is the USSR going to fare better when they get no advanced warning and are faced with an fait accomple of Kuwaiti annexation?


A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

Last edited by sglancy12; 02-05-2010 at 01:21 AM. Reason: removed my self-serving apology
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