We should remember that by December 1, 1996 the Soviets have than a year of war under their belts. The Soviet bomber force is likely to be smaller than it was in mid-1995, although I would be glad to discuss the idea that stepped-up production and improved ground crew performance may have replaced losses and improved sortie rates. The ground crews and aircraft crews definitely will have more experience. Doctrine may have changed. In my as-yet-incomplete work on the Sino-Soviet War, I try to have a look at the Soviet strategic bombing experience in China. During the 1995-1996 winter stalemate, the Soviets attempt to break the deadlock with conventional strategic bombing. I think it’s reasonable to assume that in the ever-evolving contest between Soviet bombers and Chinese air defenses the Soviets will have made adaptations to their modus operendi.
Regarding air operations against the West, the opposing forces will not be in the same condition as if they had initiated hostilities from a standing start or even a deliberate build-up to single-theater operations. The interaction between Soviet, Chinese, and Western (observers and volunteers) air power and defenses in the Far East will yield some changes to pre-war norms. Not being an airman, I can’t give a lot of detail. However, I postulate that the Soviets will try whatever yielded success in China. The Chinese, who are principally on the receiving end of the beating for at least the first eight months of the Sino-Soviet War, are likely to be the first party to embrace real change to pre-war doctrine. I further postulate that said change will push the Chinese in the direction of greater pilot independence and greater flexibility in air operations planning. Western volunteers flying air defense missions against Soviet bombers and escorts certainly will contaminate the PLAAF’s climate. The Soviets probably will respond in kind once the effects of Chinese adaptations are noticed. Each side will examine the other side’s adaptations and respond accordingly.
By the time the Soviets start attacking strategic targets in Western Europe with bombers, the Soviets will be in better condition to penetrate NATO air defenses from the standpoint of crews, tactics, and techniques. I’m not prepared to speculate about force levels at the moment. The West, for their part, will have been able to observe the evolution in the Soviet bomber force in the Far East. How well NATO adapts to the insights gleaned from the Chinese experience is a matter for conjecture. I’d wager that each national air force does something a little different, although SACEUR and his commanders will act as a centripetal force drawing the various Allied reactions to the Soviet evolution into a common sphere. Time is another issue. How long does it take for the West to observe changes in Soviet air power, devise new tactics and techniques, then disseminate the new material effectively? I have no answers to that one.
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