Getting back to the original question of Army aviation assets, I agree with some of the ideas already posted. Consolidation of the surviving assets into formations large enough to have a significant impact probably would occur even before the nuclear exchange began. Attrition the conventional battlefield would be very significant, to say the least. Although I am a firm believer in the ability of American/Western aviators to adapt to changing circusmtances, given the comparative loss rates v manufacturing time available from 10/96 through 07/97, succcessful adaptation by NATO helicopter pilots means a lowered loss rate. Losses still continue to mount at a rate greatly surpassing the West's ability to replace them.
Some time ago, we had a thread about the TO&E for armor in a division in mid-2000 that had a handful of operational AFV. The general consensus was that surviving tanks would be consolidated into formations that allowed commanders to continue to use them in the types of massed formations that history has shown are the foundation of modern mobile warfare, rather than keeping surviving tanks dispersed in penny packets among many smaller formations. Additionally, if the surviving tanks are consolidated into a single battalion, administrative and support issues are somewhat simplified. This isn't to say that battalion task forces can't be created with smaller packages of armor; however, the appropriate level of command has the option to parcel out tanks or keep them concentrated at will.
The aviation picture probably looks much the same. Surviving aviation assets and support would be consolidated at whatever level was necessary to ensure that a suitably capable formation could be kept in action. At some point, we would see aviation reserved at the corps level, then at the army level. Organizational consolidation does not necessary mean that the surviving helicopters are physically co-located. Just as artillery occupying widely-dispersed firing positions can be coordinated to strike a common target, so helicopters dispersed throughout the tactical or operational rear of an army (like the Seventh US Army) can be managed to execute a common mission. Protecting these assets against nukes, chemical weapons, conventional air attacks, and commando raids would be a high priority, as well as a real challenge given the varying nature of protective methods one would take against each of these threats.
Of course, by mid-2000 all of this may be passe. Seventh US Army may be able to operate only a handful of choppers, or none at all. Lack of fuel and spares, along with the deplorable state of the lines of communication in North Central Europe, may mean that the birds become inoperable.
I like the idea of using biplanes, though. Aerial recce will be as valuable as ever in 2000. Given the lack of aircraft, it might even be possible to use gliders or stationary balloons with telescopes and video recorders. Of course, those glider pilots are going to need some inccredible intestinal fortitude.
Gliders and biplanes for recce... Something to ponder. Getting back to some of my own work (sorry, guys--it's always going to be that way), in Manifest Destiny, a cantonment capable of manufacturing biplanes in 2001 will have a lot to offer MilGov or CivGov. If biplanes can be manufactured someplace with a reasonable degree of quality control, and if they can be moved over long distances (say, in the cargo hold of an airship or cinched to the bottom of the airship's cab), and if suitable fuel can be provided, then it just might be possible for American forces working to bring CONUS back under control to operate with air power. Even given the severe limitations of biplanes, the psychological impact of the USAF supporting ground operations would be staggering. Combine biplanes, ultralights, and airships with guns, rockets, and bombs, and you might just have a winning combination.
The Shogun's going to be bummed.
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