I suspect that New American infantry formations are organized along lines that would be very familiar to American soldiers. Local adaptations will be necessary due to equipment, manpower, and circumstances. However, given the strong influence the US Army and USMC are likely to have on the organization, the light formations probably are organized more-or-less along US Army lines. The armored car formations probably are based on the three-vehicle or four-vehicle platoon model with three platoons and a headquarters section of two vehicles making a company.
Manpower shortages being what they are, even New America probably tries something more sophisticated than human waves. The so-called Big Bad One of Urban Guerilla is supposed to be a superior formation.
Two hundred percent casualties certainly is a high number, but it doesn't necessarily indicate that the unit is used without any regard for its troops. This unit has been in action for some time. One percent casualties per day of engagement means that in two hundred days of engagement the unit has suffered two hundred percent casualties. If the formation has been fighting for eighteen months, this is enough time for the Big Bad One to have been involved in a large number of engagements resulting in one percent casualties, plus enough time to be rotated to the rear to absorb replacements. A few big fights might cost the formation three or ten percent casualties, after which time it would absorb replacements. A hardened core of NCOs and company grade officers would emerge from this kind of treatment.
Bear in mind that it's the FNG who is at greatest risk. A seasoned platoon sergeant will have a lot of new privates shot out from under his supervision when a unit is constantly moving between combat and refit over the course of several months. Urban combat results in a high turnover of personnel. Just ask Sixth German Army.
Webstral
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