The handling of replacements is an important issue. It seems that the US Arrmy has learned that unit integrity is important, if Iraq and Afghanstan are indicators. However, we received some augmentees about 2/3 of the way through the tour. They just showed up and were distributed. (A California National Guard unit that had not been mobilized for OIF 3 was mobilized for 120 days and parceled out among the components of 29th Infantry Brigade).
During the Battle of Poland, there would be enormously strong pressure to send the fresh meat right to the front. Canon indicates that NATO losses were heavy during the drive across Poland. It's hard to imagine that losses were not extraordinary during the withdrawal. I wonder what guidance SACEUR would have given on the subject.
Much the same is probably true of the fighting in Korea during the same timeframe. The drive to the Yalu would have resulted in massive casualties. Senior commanders, anxious to keep up the momentum, would have wanted their fresh privates commmitted ASAP. They would be aware of the "model" formula that says a unit should be in hard action for a week, followed by rest, refit, and retraining for two weeks. No one ever seems to follow that rule, though.
Webstral
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