The Soviet military philosophy is perfectly serviceable, provided one can meet the operating conditions. The concept of seizing and holding the initiative is hardly a new one; one might say that the Germans reinforced the value of the practice in 1941 and 1942, while the Soviets turned the lesson around thereafter. Still, the uncompromising emphasis the Soviets placed on maintaining the impetus of offensive operations is noteworthy. If time is the enemy’s ally, then the only winning solution is to bring the operation to a conclusion as quickly as possible.
One reason the Soviets laid such a heavy emphasis on ground-based air defense is that they were at a disadvantage in the air. The Soviets understood that sheer numbers of aircraft were a poor match for the Western technical superiority, superior ground support, and pilot initiative. After the initial surge of high-tempo operations, the West would have a sortie advantage—effectively giving the West a quantitative as well as a qualitative advantage. Since the operation might outlast the surge, it was important to prevent the West from winning the war by default.
Another reason for the Soviet emphasis on ground-based air defense is their orientation towards battlefield support as the principal role of air power. While the Soviets moved beyond a straightforward battlefield role for their air power by the mid-1970’s, the emphasis never really went away. They were keenly aware of how roughly their own Il-2 fleet had handled the Germans. Ground-based air defenses would give Army commanders some means of offsetting a major opposing force effort to establish air superiority over a given sector of the front (like wherever offensive was going well) if the SAF dropped the ball.
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