Quote:
Originally Posted by dragoon500ly
But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion....
The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure......
The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?
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The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.
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Not just Monty, but especially the air and airborne planners. No one thought of packing a bridge onto a glider (OK, lots of gliders)? What about seizing and opening an airfield to airlift supplies (like AT guns or bridges)? IIRC, Eindhoven had an airport.
Me, I've become something of a Montgomery fan over time, recognizing that he had to work with the tools he had-- a British army that had been defeated more often than not, and was on the wrong side of the manpower curve. The British seemed to do well in controlled, "set-piece" battles, and not when improvising. Against the Germans, one needs to bring one's "A" game, and not just slap something together. That's something Alanbrooke tried very hard to impress on US staffers prior to D-Day, too.