Quote:
Originally Posted by Adm.Lee
They also didn't quite account for the manpower that would be needed to field the Army Air Force and base forces, either. They had to compromise on 90 divisions.
A big reason the divisions were stripped down as much as they were, was to minimize the shipping needed to send them overseas. After all, a division going to the Pacific might not need the tank-destroyer battalion or tank battalion that an ETO division did. And even then, there were not enough GHQ tank or TD battalions for each infantry division to keep one of each permanently, they rotated among divisions as needed in the ETO.
As it was, just about all of the "normal" attachments (tank battalion, AAA battalion) were standardized in the postwar TO&E.
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Yeah, that led to the divisional tank battalion, the regimental cannon company (M-4 w/105mm hows), the regimental tank company (17 M-26)...by the time all of the "attachments" became official, the infantry division would field 197 tanks...the armored divisions would have 272 tanks.
The shipping problem was the real drive to streamline the divisions. But it was the excess wasted on the numerous support units that really caused the problems. This bleed off heavily impacted the combat arms to such an extent that by 1944, Eisenhower had to make the decision to cull his service units in order to make up shortfalls in infantry replacements, this led Marshall to cancel many programs (ATSP for one, several army air forces cadet classes for another) and send these men to Europe as replacements.