Quote:
Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer
They were that convinced we could stop them with conventional arms?
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Given the guiding philosophy of the Soviets, I think it's safer to say that they didn't care for the odds. Western propaganda of the day aside, the Soviets were more concerned about a third Western invasion of Russia in a century than they were interested in expanding westward. Their experience in WW2 showed them that wars are best fought on the enemy's territory on terms that can be dictated by the attacker. Therefore, the best way to protect the Motherland against the Germans and their Western allies would be a victory over Germany on German soil using the procedures of the strategic offensive so thoroughly ingrained into Soviet military thinking after 1942. The offensive into Germany had to work in order to be worth the investment. Given the scale of Western resources, it would be very important to bring offensive operations in Germany to a successful conclusion quickly. The nature of the terrain in the American sector might preclude rapid victory in southern Germany. A north-to-south roll-up of CENTAG by Soviet forces operating along the Rhine might not be practicable within the desired timeframe. Therefore, a nuclear opening offered the best prospects for the kind of early success the Soviets needed. Of course, a nuclear opening might very well render the whole point of winning the war moot. Therefore, though it was useful to have a powerful conventional army on-hand to provide offensive security for the Soviet Union, its use posed problems that were best avoided.
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