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Old 06-20-2011, 09:01 PM
RN7 RN7 is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by dragoon500ly View Post
Of all of the stupidity with which the Japanese approached WWII with, the use of her merchant fleet had to be the shining example of how not to fight a modern war. One can only wonder if the war would have lasted into 1945 if the USN had started with a operational torpedo?
Its often been said that American submarines succeeded in doing to Japanese shipping in the Pacific, to what Germany's submarines failed to do to Allied shipping in the Atlantic. In fact Allied shipping losses from the end of 1941-45 were more then twice in tonnage to what the Japanese lost in the Pacific, and in 1942 Allied shipping losses were six times greater in tonnage in the Atlantic alone to Japanese losses in the Pacific.

Japan actually produced as many submarines as Britain in WW2 (167), although this pales in comparison to Germany who producing twice as much as the rest of the world combined. German submarine technology and tactics progressed rapidly throughout the war.

They were the first to fit the Dutch Snorkel design into their submarines. The Germans also made rapid progress in the development of battery capacity, sonars, homing torpedoes, and fitted hydraulic torpedo loaders onto the Type XXI which gave them the ability to fire 18 torpedoes in under 20 minutes. The Type XXI was considered revolutionary, being able to remain submerged almost all of the time and also faster than all previous designs worldwide, due to the improved streamlining of their shape, batteries with larger capacity and the snorkel, which allowed diesel engines to be used while submerged. Streamlined and hydrodynamically clean hull design allowed later war German submarines to have high submerged speed, being able to outrun many surface ships while submerged, combined with improved dive times, making it much harder to chase and destroy. Yet they lost 785 submarines.

The reason being the Allies, the British in particular, recognised from the outset the danger of the submarine to not only naval shipping but commerce. In addition to the convoy and escort system, Allied anti-submarine weapons and counter-measures kept pace with and even surpassed German submarine developments and tactics, to the point that Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic declined from 6.1 million tonnes in 1942, to 500,000 tonnes in 1944. Geman submarine losses rose from 87 in 1942 to 242 in 1944.

Unlike Britain the Japanese failed to make provisions to protect their shipping until it was way too late, and it was far to little to stop American submarines from choking Japanese imports and resupply to outlying bases and garrisons. Initially it was probably out of arrogance due to their early successes, but they were hoplessely outclassed by Allied technology as the war progressed. Japan also failed to properly utilise its large submarine fleet from the start of the war. They had 63 operational submarines in December 1941 which were as good as what the US Navy had, with better torpedoes. Yet until later in the war when they were on the retreat they largely ignored Allied shipping and went looking for warships. In 1942 Japan lost a million tons of shipping and sunk 7 American submarines. In 1944 Japan lost nearly 4 million tons of shipping and sank 20 American submarines, and lost 56 of her own submarines.
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