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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in authorizing the Guadalcanal operation, made a serious error in appreciating the time required to move supplies to the South Pacific and compounded this error by simple ignorance of the general physical layout of the theater and its stark primitiveness.

The initial plan was for the Army to set up a supply line that ran directly from San Francisco, lacking resources at Pear Harbor, the Navy followed suit. There was no coordination of supply activities and both services were requisitioning separate shipping for the long haul to the same destinations.

The Commander of the South Pacific theater, Admiral Ghormley chose Auckland, New Zealand to become the advance base for the US. Auckland lay 5,680 miles from San Francisco and 1,825 miles from Guadalcanal (New York City, for example is only 3,500 miles form Liverpool or Casablanca, the advance bases for the European and Mediterranean theaters).

Ghormley came under fire for this decision, but he was well aware that distance alone would not be the sole element affecting shipping movement. Cargos loaded in San Francisco would have to be unloaded, sorted, stored and then reloaded before movement to the combat areas. This required deepwater harbors with berthing, lighterage, warehouses, cranes and stevedores. Only Auckland had all of these. The forward bases at Espiritu Santo and Efate (and, of course, Guadalcanal) had none of these refinements. Noumea possesed four berths but none of the other facilities needed.

The Joint Chiefs had foreseen the need for specially equipped units to build advance bases. Detachements has been organized, code-named "Lions" for large advanced fleet bases and "Cubs" for internediate fuel and supply bases. Ghormley requested one of each as well as essentials such as naval construction battalions. No Lions would arrive in the South Pacific in 1942 and the first Cub to arrive at Noumea, did so without its desperately needed lighterage and pontoons.

Noumea, the advanced base supporting Guadalcanal best displayed the failure to appreciate the logistical problems of the theater. The port had a maximum capacity of twenty-four ships a month, by September 23, 1942, the harbor held eighty-six cargo ships that had become substitutes for nonexistent warehouse space. Many of the ships lacked the cranes to offload the heavy cargo, cranes that would not be available until October. Cargo intended for Brisbane was loaded on top of carge intended for Noumea. Shipping manifests often identified their cargos as "machinery" or "dry goods". A shortage of labor and transportation left tons of unmarked and unsorted stores stacked helter-skelter, exposed to the weather and to pilferage. Both services separately unloaded its ships and sometimes only partly unloaded a ship and returned it to anchor.

The local Army commander, General Patch cooperated with Ghormley in trying to tame this diaster. He formed a provisional port company of his own at Noumea and recruited more laborers. He supplied Army clothing and food to Naval personnel and when Vandegrift requested machetes (essential for jungle movement), Patch had his engineers modified and ship some of the 20,000 cavalry sabers that had been sent to Noumea.

Moving supplies the 1,100 miles from Noumea to Guadalcanal (roughly the distance from New Orleans to New York City) was another difficulty. R4Ds (Navy DC-3/C-47s) carried critical items, such as fuel and evacuated most of the wounded. A single squadron was available initially (18 planes), a second squadron did not reach the theater until late October. The lack of port facilities at Guadalcanal required those cargo ships equipped with landing craft to haul supplies for the final leg. This practice had an important impact on the Navy's tactical capabilities. Because of the limited ability of the marines to litterally manhandle supplies, the transports had to be sent up in twos and threes, generating severe strains on the scarce destroyer resources available for escorts. This escort duty, fractured all division and squadron integrity, with deadly consequences in the night surface actions around Guadalcanal.