Quote:
Originally Posted by dragoon500ly
When I first read Flawed Victory I was certain that the author had erred in many ways...until I was able to see a copy of the Gunfire Support Plan. One is left with the impression that General Bradley who oversaw the planning, had dropped the ball, badly.
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I found it interesting, in a disappointing sort of way, that Gen. Marshall made a point of yanking Maj. Gen. Corlett out of the Pacific and sending him to Bradley to command a Corps. Corlett had commanded a corps-sized task force that invaded Attu and Kiska (August 1943), and then the 7th Division at Kwajalein (Jan-Feb 44). Bradley apparently reacted badly to having someone come in and give him advice how to run an amphibious landing, saying that the Pacific was "bush league."
This was despite Corlett's experience included studying the Tarawa battlefield with the Marines, and working out a deadly efficient fire-support plan with the Navy. Bradley did participate in the Sicily landings, including the smaller ones on the north coast, but he should have been aware that Normandy would be a different animal.
Corlett's XIX Corps HQ did not land at D-Day, but much later. Even then, they were not favored by First Army, and Corlett was sacked during the slogging of November '44. On the other hand, Utah's corps commander was J. Lawton Collins, who had commanded a division on Guadalcanal and New Georgia (but it appears to me, no landings), and had also been sent by Marshall to Bradley.
Putting Corlett and not Gerow in charge at Omaha might have led to a different fire-support plan?