Quote:
Originally Posted by simonmark6
Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.
I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.
|
I'm sort of an admirer of Churchill. I like the quote by Portal or Brooke (I can't remember which) to the effect, "Winston has ten ideas before breakfast each day. My job is to sort out the 1 really bad one, and the 2 bad ones from the seven good ones before he implements them all."
IMO, his strategic instincts outstripped the capabilities of the British Empire (and the Allies), and he was reluctant to let go of things in the "nice to have, but we don't have the time or the forces to do that" categories.
To wit, Gallipoli nearly succeeded, and would have been fantastic if it had succeeded, but it didn't. It was, at least, worth trying.
Re: North Africa and the Mediterranean campaign, no less than General Marshall admitted that it was a necessity for the Allies, and that he was wrong to have opposed it. Primary evidence: suppose the US II Corps that was shattered at Kasserine Pass had been in Normandy, instead of the divisions that were there in June 1944?