[Webstral]

The idea that the Stryker is better-suited for one type of operation than another goes to the heart of one of the US Army’s biggest problems: we try to do a one-size-fits-all force instead of dividing the force into specialty units that can be retrained for other missions in a pinch. I’ve pitched the idea of greater specialization before, but I’ll keep doing it for the practice.

There need to be several US Army variants. There needs to be an Old Guard that looks great in parades and worries about whether the general is getting enough fiber. This job has been filled the US Army. There needs to be an Army that kills folks and breaks things and does nothing else. Killing folks and breaking things are skills. As the destructive potential of conventional weapons continues to rise, the need for skilled and motivated small unit leaders grows ever greater. Moreover, the men who volunteer for the combat arms signed up to kill folks and break things. Using them for other things like peacekeeping is downright wasteful of their motivation and the time they need to continue to grow their ability to kill folks and break things efficiently and effectively. The initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrates that a small effective force can move the required distance and get the conventional job done. When we’re talking about fuel hogs like the M1 Abrams, numbers don’t always equal security or rapid mission accomplishment. High quality tankers, artillery crews, combat engineers, and light infantry need a lot of practice executing a relative handful of battle drills.

Then there needs to be an Army that does the bulk of the peacekeeping. These guys do things like man the checkpoints and generally police the place after the steely-eyed killers have done their bit. The peacekeepers have at least as much in common with police as they do with the throat slashers. The peacekeepers need a whole different set of skills than the war fighters. More importantly, the peacekeepers need a whole different mindset and set of expectations of their role than the war fighters. Tank crews and light infantry sign on to be in combat. Peacekeepers sign on to keep the peace. There is some common ground, but the common ground is less than the ground that is not in common.

The majority of the peacekeepers should be reservists. Reservists tend to be older than their Regular Army counterparts. My experience in Iraq indicates that older men are less eager to press the trigger. Older men are married and have children at higher rates. Perhaps those of us with wives and children have an easier time imagining what happens when undisciplined fire goes through the walls of residential areas. In any event, older reservists (who generally are less physically fit for the demands of combat) have more of the mindset needed for peacekeeping. Perhaps most importantly, peacekeeping is more forgiving than combat.