[dragoon500ly]

And once again....here is the "other" China and a big thanks to the Military Balance series!

The Republic of China
Population: 18,500,000
Army: 310,000
12 heavy infantry divisions
6 light infantry divisions
6 armd/inf bdes
3 airbonre bdes
4 tank groups
20 field artillery battalions
5 SAM battalions
6 army aviation squadrons

310 M-48 MBT
325 M-24 (upgraded to 90mm gun) light tanks
795 M-41 light tanks
100 M-8 armd cars
150 M-3 half-tracks
1,100 M-113 APCs
150 V-150 Commando APCs
300 M-59 155mm towed hows; 350 M-116 75mm towed pack hows; 550
M-101 105mm towed hows; 90 M-114 towed 155mm hows; 10 M-115 towed
203mm hows; 225 M-108 SP 105mm hows; 125 M-109A1 SP 155mm hows;
75 M-110 SP 203mm hows
1,200 81mm mortars
300 towed and SP 127mm MRLs
150 M-18 tank destroyers
500 106mm RCLs
400 Kun Wu (TOW clone) ATGMs
300 40mm AA guns
400 Nike Hercules SAMs (missiles only)
800 HAWK SAMs (missiles only)
20 Chaparral SAMs
118 UH-1H helo
2 KH-4 helo
7 CH-34 helo
??? Hsiung Feng coastal defence SSM (copy of Gabriel SSM)
??? Ching Feng coastal defence SSM (copy of Nike Hercules)
(on order 164 M-113 APC; 125 M-109A1 SP 155mm hows; 75 M-110 SP 203mm hows; 1,000 TOW ATGM; 370 IHAWK SAMs)

Reserves: 1,500,000 forming 9 additional infantry divisions; an additional 1,300,000 have reserve obligations of some kind)

Navy: 38,000
2 d-e subs, US Guppy II-class
24 destroyers: 11 Gearing; 1 Gearing radar picket; 8 Sumner; 4 Fletcher
9 frigates: 8 Lawrence, 1 Crosley
3 corvettes
28 FAC(M)
5 FAC(T)
28 coastal patrol craft
12 ex US Adjutant and 268 coastal MCM
2 LSD, 23 LST, 4 LSM, 22 LCU, 400 LCVP
1 repair ship
2 transports
7 tankers
(on order, 2 Zwaardvis-class d-e subs; 6 FAC(M))

Reserves: 45,000

Marines: 39,000
3 divisions
200 LVT-4/-5 APCs
125 105mm towed hows
48 155mm towed hows
200 106mm RCLs

Reserves: 35,000

Air Force: 77,000
9 FGA sqns with 82 F-5A, 226 F-5E and 22 F-5F
2 FGA sqns with 42 F-100A/D
2 FGA sqns with 40 F-104D/G
1 interceptor sqn with 19 F-104A
1 recon sqn with 4 RF-104G
1 MR sqn with 9 S-2A, 30 S-2E
1 ASW hel sqn with 12 Hughes 500MD
1 SAR sqn with 8 HU-16B ac, 10 UH-1H helo
6 tpt sqns with 30 C-47, 5 C-54, 1 C-118B, 59 C-119, 10 C-123, 1 Boeing
720B
Trainers include 55 PL-1B, 32 T-33A, 30 T-28, 20 F-5B/F, 68 TF-104G, 6
F-104D, 12 F-100F
2 hel sqns with 7 UH-19, 10 Bell 47G
(on order 60 F-5E/F)

Reserves: 90,000

Paramilitary Forces: Taiwan Garrison Command: 25,000

While the eventual return to the mainland is the stated goal of the ROC, the prospects of accomplishing this by classical invasion decrease. The ROC now emphasizes the capability of fast-moving special units that can reach the mainland and cooperate with anti-Communist or non-Communist risings against the Peking regime. This would take place in a time of turbulence and internal strife on the mainland and would be the first step in the reunion of all CHina under Nationalist leadership.

Meantime, attention goes to the assurance of economic progress and the maintenance of strong armed forces which, while they now seem to be oriented toward effective defense, would be able to act offensively under proper conditions. The defense costs borne and the commitments made testify to the realism of the Nationalist view.

The strategic problem facing the ROC is massive in size, but straightforward. There is only one enemy and only one national policy goal. The governments in Taipei and Peking agree that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part. The US acknowledged the existence of this condition in the Shanghai Communique, issued at the end of the Nixon visit to the mainland in 1972 and reaffirmed when the US officially recognized the Peking government in 1978. Taipei now enjoys full recognition from fewer than twenty nations, and this number is decreasing.

In essence, there exists an unfinished civil war. The Nationalists have stated that their goal is the recovery of the mainland. The Peking government has stated that their goal is the recapture of their wayward island.

Obviously, the abrupt withdrawal of US diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in December 1978 shocked Nationalist leaders. President Carter also announced the withdrawal of US troops from the island and abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1955. Peking insists that the settlement of the Taiwan problem is a purely Chinese matter and has made no open commitment not to use force. The US has implied however, that there is a tacit understanding to this effect. American officials have also stated that the sale of certain weapons to Taipei would continue. The Communist leaders have not accepted this condition, but have not allowed the American statements to stand in the way of the new relationship with the US.

Under the circumstances, the Nationalists strive to maintain and improve their military forces. They have stated that they will not negotiate with Peking, nor will they seek help from the Soviet Union. This latter course is not without its attractions, not least of which is is that this exposes the PRC to the threat of a major two-front conflict.

Taipei's determination to retain control over the offshore islands---the Quemoy and Matsu groups---has posed a major strategic problem for the Nationalists. Their determination, a strongly fortified position and extensive American assistance have combined to maintain ROC control of the islands. This was accomplished despite repeated and massive bombardments and numerous threats of Communist offensives. The political importance of the islands lies in the fact that the Nationalists still hold more than one province (the islands are part of Fukien Province). The islands also have strategic value, particularly Quemoy, which controls entry to the port of Amoy and sea traffic in the area.

Moving to more specific strategic problems, the Nationalists face a mainland army that, despite its backwardness, is very large. The problems if maintaining an acceptable air situation are paramount. Neither side has the naval capability to execute a sizable amphibious or airborne assault on the other without previous attrition operations of considerable magnitude.

The narrow width of the island of Taiwan poses a significant defense problem. Taiwan's military planners recognize and prepare to cope with this situation. Air bases, all on the west coast, may be subjected to saturation attacks from the mainland, but hardened shelters, modern air-to-air weapons and superior aircraft promise a very costly undertaking for the PRC. All-in-all neither side has the ability to project offensive power.

The only full alliance of the ROC has been the Mutual Security Treaty with the US. In the past, the US has availed itself of the treaty and collateral agreements to base air force units on Taiwan and to use the naval facilities there. Intelligence sharing has been routine and the ROC has been supplied with U-2 aircraft for extended reconnaissance. Several important US communications facilities have been maintained. The island served as a major forward supply and support base for American forces during the Vietnam War. At the war's peak, some 9,000 US troops were stationed in Taiwan. The US declined offers of ROC military participation during the Vietnam War, as it had done during the Korean War. However several ROC civic action groups worked in South Vietnam, assisting the government in rural development programs. All such arrangements are now terminated.