The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks?
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control?
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be?
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations?
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies?
My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.
Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.
Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.
I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.
With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!
Thanks-
Dave
|