Quote:
Originally Posted by dragoon500ly
The Soviets are well aware of this system, but they have made the decision not to use it. Their belief that the NATO system's almost total reliance on radio communications will fail under the power of Soviet electronic warfare. NATO's fire control system will also be vulnerable to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons and finally they realize the difficultly of using a microphone while wearing a NBC suit or a protective mask.
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The Soviets also don’t trust their junior officers to exercise initiative on their own. Predictable tactical performance is a predicate of flexible operational performance. Lieutenants, captains, and light colonels can’t go screwing with the fire plan just because they have a local problem. Junior officers who are accustomed to exercising their own initiative are dangerous—dangerous to the operational plan and dangerous to the State. Soldiers of almost any rank can be replaced, according to the Soviet way of thinking. The security of the State cannot be compromised; and if that means a clunky performance on the battlefield, then so be it.
I’m reading
The Soviet-Afghan War by the Russian General Staff (translated into English and edited by American officers). I read this book several years ago, but I find this time around I’m paying closer attention to some of the details that eluded me the first time. The Russians note the inability of detailed fire plans to respond to fluid situations. The Muj fought in place or maneuvered as circumstances dictated—often in total disregard of the Soviet plan of action. Combat aviation responded well, but the artillery did not for some time. Once the artillery acquired a degree of flexibility, the rest of the Soviet Army struggled to keep the newly acquired flexibility of the
afghansty contained in Afghanistan. I’ve read this sort of thing before, but it’s useful to review periodically.
I’ve often assumed that the hard-learned lessons of the Far East would make their way to Europe quickly. Now I’m questioning that assumption. If the Soviet troops in the Far East learned a degree of tactical flexibility in response to Operation Red Willow (the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995) and the failed Pact offensive of Spring 1996 (is there a name for this anywhere?), then the Soviets might try to keep said flexibility in its Far Eastern bottle. The same might apply to air operations as well. If so, then the entrance of the USAF, RAF, and CFAC (Canadian Forces Air Command) would have creamed Soviet air power in Central Europe. On the ground, the Soviets would have found the GSFG fighting in a fashion for which neither training nor doctrine was well-suited at all. Just how the Soviet experience in the Far East affected the Soviet (and Pact) forces in Eastern Europe is a question worth reexamining.