[Webstral]

Rae, as you know so well I’m in no position to offer judgment of work that doesn’t square perfectly with the established body of material. I think your idea could be made to square with the established body of material with a few caveats, such as having Operation Omega be Plan B or Plan C for the aftermath of the Summer 2000 offensive. I also can’t fault you for being short-tempered over the canon/non-canon issue. It’s been a source of tension ever since the DC Group left.

Simon, I also support your thinking about the multiplicity of missions. While this thinking doesn’t make sense in the doctrinal AirLand Battle sense, times have changed a bit since the halcyon days of early 1997 and the planning stages of 1999. Desperation messes with thinking, and surely the post-Exchange world fosters desperation in everyone. Getting spares and equipment to Third German Army throughout 1999 must have been a herculean effort. Spare parts, ammunition, and other necessities no longer being manufactured or transported can only have come from another unit with that gear. Getting US formations in Europe to part with a portion of their lovingly horded stocks during 1999 would have only slightly easier than trying to fix the transmission of an M1 with dental tools and duct tape. A few MPs and other folks working for the highest level of command as they tried to requisition the stocks probably lost their lives. For many reasons, SACEUR probably would have felt enormous pressure to have the Summer 2000 offensive pay off big. The objectives probably took on a life of their own as all of players began putting their eggs into the basket.

We’ve discussed the Soviet intent for Fourth Guards Tank Army before, but I can’t help wondering again whether the Soviets intended any offensive action in 2000 using Fourth Guards Tank Army or whether the force was used exactly as it was intended to be used. A mobile force based in Belarus could be turned against NATO in Poland, rebels in the Ukraine, or even Polish troublemakers. One wonders to what degree the surviving Soviet leadership in 2000 was more concerned with holding what remained than with trying to change the balance vis-à-vis the Western Allies.