[Webstral]

The author who thinks the US would back down for a peaceful resolution after suffering the kind of defeat outlined in Scenario One has his finger someplace else besides the pulse of modern America. The more humiliating the defeat, the less likely the American public is to let the matter go to a negotiated settlement with the enemy having the upper hand. President Gingrich is a hawk of the old school.

Depending on one’s point of view, there are some favorable outcomes here. The USAF would get a good look at the capabilities of the B-2 operating under the conditions for which it was designed. The USN would have the opportunity to test its ability to maintain a blockade against a nation the size and power of China. Ultimately, though, the USN could prevent 95% of maritime traffic in and out of China by sitting beyond the continental shelf. These things might not bring China to her knees by themselves, but they’d sure cause some problems.

At this point, the holding of US debt by China becomes a non-issue. The US simply reneges on the debt and explains to the rest of the debt holders that this is what China gets for going to war with the US. There might be some ripples in the value of US debt as a result, but no one could possibly be surprised. As an added bonus, the US would find herself free of a considerable portion of her debt burden.

While the USN throttles China’s foreign exchange and the USAF whittles away at strategic targets, forces must be assembled to recapture Taiwan. The first step, of course, would be to interdict all traffic between the PRC and Taiwan. The B-2s probably would be the first players here, using PGM to hit the appropriate facilities along the Chinese coast until the job could be handed off to someone else. Interdicting air traffic would be tougher, and so the PRC might be able to move light troops to Taiwan in some numbers for a while. The air war would be fascinating. At its climax, the air war probably would encompass the entire coast of China, the hinterland, the ROK, Taiwan, and Japan. Given the numbers situation at the beginning and the geography, we’d find out what our advantages in training and technology are worth.

Sooner or later, though, the US and allies would establish air superiority over Taiwan and the Strait. At this point, Chinese strength on the ground would have reached its zenith. The next big question would be the landings. There are so many variables here that I can’t do much to quantify them. How many Chinese troops are there on Taiwan? How many tanks? How many guns? Which units are involved? Realistically, how many Marines can the US put ashore in the first wave? Are we going to try putting in airborne units? What is the operational value of the Taiwanese resistance? I could go on and on?

Here are a couple more issues to be considered: what is US public opinion doing during this process? What is the cost of the war? What is the correlation between public opinion and cost? What do the allies think? What is the diversion of US forces from other missions? Are the allies willing to pick up the slack elsewhere? What is Iran doing during this time? What are the North Koreans doing during this time? I won’t insult the intelligence of the members of this forum by suggesting that President Gingrich will give a damn about global public opinion.

Here’s the bottom line: any Chinese effort at a knockout blow would backfire for them just as it did for Japan. Americans hate being dry gulched, and we hate being embarrassed. Put the two together, and you’ve got a commitment to war not seen since 1941.