The fact is that some of the accounting has gaps. I’ve never really sweated it. The GDW guys had a big job, and this was before the Internet. I have always seen my job in regards to the Twilight: 2000 universe as deputy to the guys who created it. When the sheriff misses something, I do my best to catch it, smooth it over, or act in keeping with his philosophy to put things right.
Okay, so I said elsewhere that I was going to try to demonstrate how we used to do things here. Here goes:
The most important point I want to make is that I appreciate that you’re looking into the numbers, Olefin. I like the idea of some allowances being made for shipment of materiel from Europe to the Middle East in the wake of the failure of the Summer 2000 offensive. I’m not sure the argument in favor of an alternative Operation Omega is ironclad, though. There are some items that deserve consideration.
I’ve always wondered about the AFV v Tanks notation. I don’t agree that AFV numbers automatically means tanks. Not all AFV are tanks. I have wondered if GDW switched to giving AFV numbers because players weren’t assigning APC and IFV to the divisions listed in US Army Vehicle Guide because the notation didn’t strongly enough suggest their presence. I know that in at least one location in the v1 rules the authors state that numbers of tanks are given so that the referee will have some idea of how many lighter fighting vehicles should be assigned. Nonetheless, the creative team made the switch from listing strength in tanks to listing strength in AFV. I have operated under the assumption that giving a unit’s strength in AFV gives the referee more latitude to decide what kind of AFV are still in operation. The apparent increase in numbers of fighting vehicles in CENTCOM could simply be the inclusion of M2, M3, and M113 in the totals for the division.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Olefin
… repaired tanks - they only had 39 in the whole theater in June and suddenly another 35 show up from repairs with no spare parts and no shipments from the US?
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I have always believed that the US Army and the USMC would make every effort to recover damaged tanks. 24th ID likely has a depot with disabled vehicles that are cannibalized for parts. Every division probably has their own arrangement for storing nonoperational vehicles for salvage and for putting back into operation if parts become available. We should remember that most tank losses are the results of breakdowns. Under ideal conditions, almost all of these tanks are repaired and put back into action, though not always in the battle towards which they were moving when they broke down. After the Exchange, however, some types of breakdowns will permanently sideline the track. I’m no tanker, so I don’t know which types of breakdowns are the most common among the M1. I do know that even (or especially) a well-maintained tank unit experiences certain types of breakdowns more commonly than others. Some parts wear out more quickly than others. Lack of those parts can deadline otherwise mission capable tracks.
We know that Operation Omega didn’t allow room for much in the way of heavy equipment. I do remember from either RDF Sourcebook or King’s Ransom that 6,000 troops find their way from Europe to the Gulf. It’s possible that operational tracks in Germany were cannibalized for parts most needed in the Gulf. Even if we assume that AFV translates into MBT or LAV-75, we’re only talking about a battalion of tanks. The power plants for 35 tanks would be much easier to transport than the tanks themselves. If the problem parts were even smaller, they’d be even easier to transport.
Of course, what I’m suggesting might be interpreted to really annoy the Germans. We know they aren’t keen on having all those AFV moving off the front lines. If the Americans pull vital parts out and leave the tanks in a park at Bremerhaven, the Germans might take that pretty poorly. On the other hand, their ability to keep M1s in good repair isn’t promising. If the parts the Americans want to take are all mobility related, the M1s can be redistributed and dug in, just as the defense force of Krakow does with its immobile tanks. Whether they are running or not, the M1s almost certainly are going to go back to the front on tank carriers, not under their own power. So the Germans might not have an issue (to whatever degree the opinion of the Germans matters) with the Americans yanking the power plants, tracks, or other mobility assemblies for shipment to the Gulf.
An even simpler explanation is that the Americans set up in Germany an assembly line for making some of the parts most commonly needed by M1. The Germans have the right labor force and the right equipment base for this sort of thing. Production probably would not be at all impressive. However, the Americans might insist on having all of the stocks go with them before turning the facility over to the Germans. In this case, the Germans might be able to provide some maintenance for the M1s they inherit.
The helicopter discrepancies are harder to explain, although again the arrival of parts from Europe for grounded birds offers an option.
None of the foregoing is meant to imply that there can’t be a major shipment of machines to the Gulf. I am, however, saying that there are ways to explain the apparent discrepancies in the numbers between mid-2000 and the beginning of 2001 that don’t involve shipping large numbers of MBT from Germany to the Gulf.