[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

Web, I would lean to the V2 vs. V1 as far as tanks/AFV's go to still mean tanks. I looked at the V2 USVG, and they break out only MBT's in the listings, so saying that its still a yard stick to measure how well equipped a unit is (1 tank usually means, say, 3 IFV's for example).

At least thats how I read it.

Fair enough. I don’t have any of the v2 materials, so I am willing to take your word on the content. I should be in the habit of qualifying my observations by letting readers know that I’m referring to v1.

Originally Posted by kato13

A quick comparison between The V1 Sov Vehicle Guide and the V1 Rdf SourceBook shows the same counts for AFVs and Tanks. I would think the terms are interchangeable from that observation (as the manpower counts remain exactly the same for the 10 units I checked).

This is odd given they are 6 months apart, but is does show that US units grew while Soviet Units were static in terms of Heavy Vehicles.

Thanks for doing some independent legwork, Kato.

It seems that the heart of the conflict is the accounting system used in US Army Vehicle Guide, Soviet Vehicle Guide, and RDF Sourcebook. Some of the figures change, and others do not. The unit listings switch from Tanks to AFV. The increase in manpower and the arguable increase in track counts are presented as evidence of a shipment of tanks to the Middle East above and beyond the 6,000 troops mentioned at the end of the chronology given in RDF Sourcebook. Let’s be systematic and give all of these factors some study. If Olefin is right, then he deserves credit and support. Whether he’s right or not, we need to model the behavior we want from our newcomers.

I want to make it clear that this is not an effort to debunk the idea of a CENTCOM reinforcing mission involving tanks and choppers. This is an effort to debunk the idea that the reference materials available to us offer incontrovertible evidence that such a mission took place. I invite creative ventures. I discourage my comrades from writing as though they possess special and invulnerable insight into the world of Twilight: 2000 based on materials that often (and possibly deliberately) have a degree of ambiguity.

I will list the measures of strength by unit and group them by command, just as they are given in the RDF Sourcebook. I’ll post two figures: the strength in the Soviet Vehicle Guide, then the strength in the RDF Sourcebook. I’ve underlined the formations for which one or more figures have changed. I haven’t included the aviation units because the Tank v AFV issue doesn’t apply to them.

Soviet Transcaucasus Front HQ
212th Air Assault Bde (800 men)
212th Guards Air Assault Bde (800 men)

104th Guards Air Assault Division (1800 men, 16 tanks)
104th Guards Air Assault Division (1200 men, 16 AFV)

Seventh Soviet Guards Army
24th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (400 men)
24th GMRD(C) (400 cav)

75th Motorized Rifle Division (2000 men, 18 AFV)
75th MRD (2000 men, AFV)

164th Motorized Rifle Division (2000 men, 12 tanks)
164th MRD (2000 men, 12 AFV)

261st Motorized Rifle Division (400 men, 3 tanks)
261st MRD (400 men, 3 AFV)

Fourth Soviet Army
26th Motorized Rifle Division (200 men)
26th MRD (2000 men)

31st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1000 men, 9 tanks)
31st GMRD (1000 men, 9 AFV)

146th Motorized Rifle Division (2000 men, 16 tanks)
146th MRD (2000 men, 16 AFV)

Forty-Fifth Soviet Army
10th Motorized Rifle Division (4000 men, 4 tanks)
10th MRD (4000 men, 4 AFV)

19th Motorized Rifle Division (4000 men, 32 tanks)
19th MRD (4000 men, 32 AFV)

147th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (100 men)
147th MRD (100 men)

First Soviet Army
8th Motorized Rifle Division (4000 men, 36 tanks)
8th MRD (4000 men, 36 AFV)

150th Motorized Rifle Division (1000 men, 2 tanks)
150th MRD (1000 men)

346th Motorized Rifle Division (200 men)
346th MRD (200 men)

Fortieth Soviet Army
15th Tank Division (4000 men, 8 tanks)
15th TD (4000 men, 8 AFV)

66th Motorized Rifle Division (1000 men, 4 tanks)
66th MRD (1000 men, 4 AFV)

84th Motorized Rifle Division (2000 men)
84th MRD (2000 men)

360th Motorized Rifle Division (3000 men, 15 tanks)
360th MRD (3000 men, 15 AFV)

My first question is why the GDW writers make the transition from a more precise term, tanks, to a less precise term—AFV—if the intent was to talk about tanks? These guys knew the difference between the terms as well as any of us. These guys knew that a reader with any knowledge of things Army would also recognize that AFV is a less precise term than tanks. I must confess that I’m flummoxed by the change if it’s supposed to mean the same thing as the original and more precise term.

There are nineteen Soviet Army formations of brigade size or greater (excepting aviation brigades) listed as belonging to Transcaucasus Front that also have entries in Soviet Vehicle Guide. Soviet Vehicle Guide gives strength as of 7/1/00. RDF Sourcebook gives strength as of 1/1/01, or thereabouts. Of these 19 formations, only 3 show any change in strength during the last six months of 2000. Before trying to look at the bigger pattern, I’ll look at the three formations that see a change in their strength.

104th Guards Air Assault Division goes from 1800 men and 16 tanks to 1200 men and 16 AFV. The losses in manpower are easily explained, although why there are no corresponding tank losses (if AFV is supposed to equal tanks) is tougher to explain. Still, anything can happen when we’re talking about a single division. 26th Motorized Rifle Division goes from 200 men in July 2000 to 2000 men in January 2001. Taken in isolation, we might see this as an example of a cadre being used as the basis for building a fresh regiment. However, we are obliged to take the division in context with the rest of the front. 150th Motorized Rifle Division has 1000 men and 2 tanks on 7/1/00 and 1000 men on 1/1/01. The two tanks are gone. It’s odd that the tanks have been lost, but the manpower is the same.

The glaring oddity, though, is that 16 of the 19 formations have exactly the same number of men on 1/1/01 as they do on 7/1/00. A single formation having the same number of men in July 2000 and January 2001 would be a statistical anomaly. Sixteen such formations, representing 84% of the divisions and separate brigades (again, non-aviation) under Transcaucasus Front, would be unable to achieve such a feat under peacetime conditions. For us to accept that such a thing could happen during the second half of 2000, we would have to believe that either the formations in question suffered no losses of any sort and gained no new troops of any sort or that the rate of loss exactly equals the combined rates of recruitment and replacement. I’ll go a fair distance with suspension of disbelief to make ideas work, but even I can’t go that far.

Unfortunately, the most obvious explanation for the statistical improbability is an uncomfortable one. The obvious explanation is that the GDW guys dropped the ball on this part of the RDF Sourcebook. Personally, that doesn’t bother me. They did a great job with just about everything else. I’m willing to live with the idea that whoever was responsible for getting the Soviet Army units listed failed to take into account the changes that would have occurred during the six month gap between July 2000 and January 2001. However, this lack of attention to detail has serious ramifications. As applied to the argument about Tanks v AFV, the numbers given for the Soviet units are at best highly suspect because in every case but one the exact same number of tanks would be available in January 2001 as in July 2000. As applied to canon as a whole, it’s clear that not everything printed by GDW passes the common sense test or is consistent with its internal logic.

In fairness, the list of Soviet units doesn’t support the argument that AFV means tanks, IFV, and APC, either. We might imagine that a given Soviet division has 12 tanks in July 2000, then loses some by January 2001. Hypothetically, when armor strength starts being listed as AFV instead of tanks, that division might have 4 surviving tanks and 8 surviving APC such that the AFV listing for 1/1/01 would match the Tanks listing for 7/1/00. If this happened once, we could accept it as a statistical anomaly. When it happens a dozen times over a mere 19 examples, something is wrong. The only reasonable conclusion is that GDW dropped the ball here.

I have a couple of other nitpicks with the RDF Sourcebook roster of Soviet units:

212th Air Assault Brigade (Soviet Vehicle Guide) becomes 212th Guards Air Assault Brigade (RDF Sourcebook). It’s entirely within the realm of possibility that someone up the chain with the authority to bestow the “Guards” moniker on a formation has done so between 7/1/00 and 12/31/00. Nonetheless, it’s an irregularity.

104th Guards Air Assault Division is listed in Soviet Vehicle Guide as having 16 tanks. This is odd, because tanks aren’t a part of an air assault division’s TO&E. The same formation is listed in RDF Sourcebook as having 16 AFV. This is more credible because BMD count as AFV and are part of the TO&E for Soviet airmobile troops. It’s also entirely possible, though, that the Soviets decided the 104th should change roles and reinforced the division with some tanks along the way.

26th Motorized Rifle Division is listed in Soviet Vehicle Guide as having 200 men. Six months later, the division has 2000 men. The most reasonable explanation for this is a typo.

147th Motorized Division is listed in Soviet Vehicle Guide as being in Alaska. 147th Guards Motorized Division is listed as being in Iran. In RDF Sourcebook, the formation in Iran is given as 147th MRD. Again, an obvious editing error.

15th Tank Division is listed as belonging to 40th Army in Soviet Vehicle Guide, but it’s in Turkmenistan as of 7/1/00. The division was moved there to put down a revolt. As of 1/1/01, the division is in southeastern Iran. Obviously, this is not impossible; however, even if we agree that the rebellion in Turkmenistan no longer was causing 15th Tank Division losses as of July 2000, it seems odd that the division completed a long road march to southeastern Iran without any losses.

In summary, the idea that Tank strength in July 2000 (which covers US Army Vehicle Guide and Soviet Vehicle Guide) automatically translates into AFV in January 2001 receives no support from the fact that Tank and AFV numbers are the same for Soviet units in Iran, since it’s obvious that GDW copied and pasted the information for the overwhelming majority of the maneuver units listed in both Soviet Vehicle Guide and RDF Sourcebook, despite the fact that 6 months have elapsed between the two. In order for the assertion that AFV strength in 1/01 refers to the same fighting vehicles as Tank strength in 7/00 to stand on its own, said assertion will need corroboration aside from the units strengths of Soviet Army formations listed in RDF Sourcebook. Otherwise, common sense tells us that AFV must refer to all armored fighting vehicles, not just tanks.

If someone knows how to reach any of the GDW team, I’d very much be in favor of them settling the matter one way or the other.

Leg, I offer my explanation regarding the transfer of power plants or other parts as a way around the apparent conundrum of leaving all AFV in Germany while supporting CENTCOM. The Germans get stiffed a bit, but the Americans can do so while meeting the terms of the agreement. Also, one or two ships can be diverted from the Omega fleet with power plants and other parts that can be loaded and unloaded without special equipment.

Now I like the idea of having Tarawa do the delivering. We can explain the increase in the number of operational helicopters with a combination of lifts for entire and intact birds and cannibalizing for spare parts. More importantly, using Tarawa to move power plants and other critical parts would not require us to get entire tracks aboard her. She isn’t nuclear powered, so we’ll have to think of a way to get her the fuel. Nonetheless, I think Olefin has a good idea having Tarawa make the trip from Germany to the Gulf. She can carry cargo and troops, so she’s a natural if she can be made to have the fuel.

Getting back to the big picture of canon, we’re faced with the same choice as people of faith. The books obviously make mistakes. If we are to play the faithful, then we have to believe certain things that are nonsensical—like the idea that 16 of 19 Soviet units in Iran could get from 7/1/00 to 1/1/01 with the exact same headcount. On the other hand, if we allow ourselves the luxury of using common sense here, then the floodgates open. We then open everything up to questioning. Each option has its associated problems. I prefer the latter approach, if only because it allows us to use our brains instead of hoping that the GDW crew used theirs perfectly while they were hurriedly producing material for a fickle market against publishing deadlines.