Quote:
Originally Posted by Raellus
Are you saying that the Argentinians didn't expect a military reaction? I suppose they thought it highly unlikely, but in military intelligence, one must look at enemy capabilities instead of trying to divine enemy intentions. The British had the capability of sending a military task force to retake the Falklands and the Argies knew this. Failing to take the possibility seriously was a colossal mistake. My argument is that, if they'd taken the possibility seriously, they could have prepared a welcome that would have stood a very good chance of securing a strategic victory.
I contend that the Argentinians were taking a gamble, hoping and praying that the British would not be willing to expend the blood and treasure necessary to win back a strategically insignificant imperial afterthought. Clearly, they miscalculated badly. But, the possibility of a British military response was an obvious possibility. It didn't/doesn't take hindsight to come to that conclusion.
I'm arguing that if the Argies had played smarter, they could have won the war. The Argies still had two weeks or so to prepare for a possible British invasion after the Thatcher government decided on a military response. I can't recall the name of the liner the Brits used to transport some of their troops to the Falklands, but its sendoff was a big public spectacle. It's not like the invasion was marshalled and launched in secret. We could start the wargame from the point the British TF left England and I think I still could have come up with a way to secure a strategic victory for the Argentinians.
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From Wikipedia..
" Argentina's original intention was to mount a quick, symbolic occupation, followed rapidly by a withdrawal, leaving only a small garrison to support the new military governor. This strategy was based on the Argentinian assumption that the British would never respond militarily. Argentine assault units were indeed withdrawn to the mainland in the days following the invasion, but strong popular support and the rapid British reaction forced the Junta to change their objectives and reinforce the islands, since they could not politically afford to lose the islands once the British came out to fight. The junta misjudged the political climate in Britain, believing that democracies were weak, indecisive and averse to risk, and did not anticipate that the British would move their fleet halfway across the globe."