[Webstral]

I want to address two items: the identifiable need for reinforcements for 49th AD and the assignment of available Operation Omega troops by rational means (as opposed to catch-as-catch-can).

As of 01 JUL 00, 49th AD disposes 3000 troops and 23 tanks and light tanks. (I just can’t bring myself to misuse the term “AFV”) The division is at something like 20% of its authorized manpower, although reductions in the number of uniformed support personnel probably place its infantry strength at a higher level. I don’t think there’s any question that the division needs reinforcements badly. Every formation in CONUS and Alaska needs reinforcements badly.

The command and staff running the CONUS side of Operation Omega are challenged to distribute the returning troops without knowing how many actually will return. As Legbreaker points out, not everyone who shows up in Bremerhaven is going to be available for dispatch as replacements. Nonetheless, Colorado Springs is going to want to have some system in place to distribute the troops who become available based on needs and feasibility.

Were I an operations staffer in Colorado Springs (in which case Milgov would be in genuinely dire straits), I would use a variation on a risk management matrix to help the bosses decide where Operation Omega troops should go. The vertical axis would be priority, and the highest value would be at the top of the column. The horizontal axis would be feasibility, and the highest value would be on the right side. Highest priority and highest feasibility would be found in the upper right of the matrix, while lowest priority and lowest feasibility would be at the bottom left. The most available troops would go to units located in the upper right. No one would go to units located in the bottom left. (If Fort Huachuca even appeared on such a matrix, it would be tucked into the bottom left corner of the graph.)

Units of Fifth US Army probably would be assigned high priority ratings because they are located along or near the Mississippi Watershed, the value of which I believe has been fairly well established. Although 90th US Corps is located well west of the Mississippi, a functional lock system along the Arkansas River will allow barge traffic to continue to move as far west as Tulsa. Since 90th US Corps is protecting the oil assets of Oklahoma, it seems reasonable to assume that the component formations of the corps will have a high priority rating. Units of First US Army probably would not receive uniformly high priority ratings. For instance, 49th MP Brigade isn’t protecting anything important in western Massachusetts. Sure, it would be nice to control the Connecticut River for transport and agriculture, but nothing in New England measures up against the resource base of the Mississippi Basin.

Feasibility is another matter entirely. One can debate whether 78th ID is going to receive a high priority rating, but it’s got to be at the top of the list for feasibility. 100th ID in Colorado is at best middlin’ until the airships underpinning Operation Manifest Destiny become available. (I seldom forego an opportunity to plug for my own work.) Sixth US Army is only surpassed in terms of infeasibility by Ninth US Army.

The question really is whether the high feasibility of using Operation Omega troops to reinforce Milgov cantonments on the East Coast outweighs the high priority of using them to reinforce Fifth US Army in the all-important heartland. Obviously, this is not an all-or-nothing prospect. However, the matrix can help generate a ratio for the available troops; for example, 40% of the available troops will go to First US Army, while the rest go to Fifth US Army.