[Webstral]

The West invested in airframes because the West had the money and the psychological framework to put into practice the philosophy that air superiority is achieved by aircraft, not ground-based systems. The Soviets put into practice a philosophy that point and area denial with dense and capable ground-based anti-aircraft systems was a cost-effective means of supporting the Army. The West expected that their huge investment in aircraft would enable them to take the initiative in the air and concentrate massive combat power on selected objectives. The Soviets expected that their robust point and area denial capability would enable their ground-based air defenses to keep the Western air forces from intervening decisively wherever the Soviets made their main effort on the ground. The West expected to use its air power to alleviate pressure on its ground forces. The Soviets expected to use their ground-based air defenses to keep the Western air forces from doing exactly that.

Obviously, this is an oversimplification. The Soviets would have entered a Red Storm Rising scenario with a major superiority in numbers of aircraft. The West would have had some effective point and area denial systems. However, where each side chose to make its major investment is telling.

I’ve seen some numbers for how much sustenance the Red Army could get from land the Germans considered scorched. If true, these numbers suggest that the Reds ought to have started with a SCR score of at least 50 (v1). However, I agree with Targan. It would have been hard for the locals that hadn’t been machine gunned to get by with the soft inner bark gnawed off all the trees in the forest, every tuber in a ten square mile area dug up and eaten, and every small mammal and bird in the same area put into “varmint surprise-ski”. Obviously, large numbers of civilians did survive. I can’t help but wonder, though, if survival didn’t mean come down to supplies rolling in behind the Red Army advance.

The degree to which US Army infantry is reliant upon close and consistent fire support is dismaying. It’s a major weakness. Once again, I feel the irresistible urge to advance my personal campaign for supplementing the traditional light/mechanized distinction in the US Army with a dragoon/grenadier distinction. Like typical mechanized infantry, the dragoons would be expected to move operationally and tactically in organic transport and to fight dismounted with close support from organic fighting vehicles as well as artillery and CAS. Dragoons could come in a variety of configurations while meeting the above conditions.

Grenadiers, on the other hand, would move tactically and operationally in vehicles belonging to a higher echelon. They would fight dismounted without close support from fighting vehicles. Support from corps-level artillery and CAS would be worked into the doctrine, but grenadiers would be expected to execute their missions without heavy fire support. I would add, though, that they should have some vehicles that could carry packs, ammunition, and other consumables over short distances so that the light fighters themselves could move and fight carrying the minimum additional mass. Every pound counts.

Dragoons probably would fight during the day, and they would never get very far from their fighting vehicles. Grenadiers probably would operate at night. Dragoons would go into the crucible of combat with the principle role of defending the tanks against the enemy’s infantry and dismounted anti-tank fires. Grenadiers would avoid combat as much as possible, preferring offensive or defensive ambushes. Dragoons could operate in any terrain, being all combined arms and junk. Grenadiers would operate in restricted terrain where the enemy’s dragoons would be forced to fight dismounted and with limited assistance from fighting vehicles. Dragoons could be produced relatively quickly. Grenadiers would take some training. Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion, superior leadership (‘cuz it needs to be mentioned twice), superior perks in the rear, and superior leadership (‘cuz it really does need to be mentioned three times) would distinguish grenadiers from dragoons. I’d have never been an NCO in a grenadier unit, though I might have done okay as a private.

Whenever the logistical situation demanded a down shifting of the tempo of mechanized operations, the grenadiers would go in to keep the front from stabilizing. They also would go in behind the lines, like the Chindits. Well-trained troops with effective light weapons can be extraordinarily effective under many conditions. Also, the grenadiers would be available to play the same game as enemy guerillas in the hinterlands, only with the advantage of aerial resupply and regular rotation out for rest and refit. Obviously, the US would need several brigades of these guys. The 82nd Airborne might qualify. I’m not up-to-speed on what the 10th Mountain has been doing since OEF started, so they may or may not count as grenadiers. I can say with certainty that 29th Infantry Brigade does not count. Not even close.