[Webstral]

I don’t think we have to work very hard to come up with an explanation for how the fighting spread to Korea. Provided one is using a v1 timeline, it seems fairly clear that the North Koreans initiated the fighting.

The US Army Vehicle Guide tells us that 2nd ID was engaged against North Korean commando units on 12/19/96 and was engaged against NK mech units by 1/3/97. This supports the idea that the NKs launched strong probes with SOF prior to launching their main offensive. I will grant that this item could be interpreted as having ROK forces invade the DPRK; the US would stay behind, as it did in West Germany, which would account for the first contact between 2nd ID and the NKs being defending against commando actions. I’m not inclined to think that the ROK attempts to reunify Korea by force of arms, though. The US has plenty to do in Europe in December 1996. Still, there is room for discussion as to whether the US is willing to be so adventurous as to allow/encourage a client to repeat West Germany’s trick while the fighting in Europe is still raging.

The US Army Vehicle Guide tells us that 7th ID arrives in the ROK in January 1997. The division participates in holding actions along the 38th Parallel throughout the first half of 1997, then moves north as part of a general offensive. The description for 25th ID reads about the same. Except for the fact that 26th ID arrives in Korea in February, its story reads about the same, too. 41st and 45th ID also participate in holding actions during the first half of 1997, then move north. 163rd ACR has pretty much the same story. The Marines mostly come to the show later, although 4th Marine Division’s history reads like that of the Army divisions.

So what we get is a single US division in Korea at the time the fighting starts. The first contact between 2nd ID and the NKs involves NK commandos. Later actions involve NK regulars. Everyone who arrives before the main Eighth US Army offensive at mid-year participates in holding actions along the 38th Parallel until the offensive kicks off. The most obvious explanation is that the North Koreans invaded South Korea, quite possibly at the urging of the USSR, in an attempt to unify Korea by force of arms while the US was engaged in Europe. The US slowly reinforced until the correlation of forces was such that offensive operations were possible. This fits nicely with pre-existing plans for war and what we know about the North Koreans in real life.

The other possibility seems to be that the ROK invades North Korea in an attempted repeat of the West German invasion of the DDR. If we go with this, then the South Koreans fare even worse than the West Germans: they don’t appear to get off the 38th Parallel on their own. Of course, it’s possible that the Americans man defensive positions along one part of the line while the ROK forces are pushing forward someplace else. Either way, it takes US forces to push deep into North Korea.

In the case of the second scenario, we must believe that the South Koreans believe there has been a significant change in the correlation of forces such that the ROK has a chance to pursue offensive operations in the North to a successful conclusion. In order for the South Koreans to believe this, they would have to believe that they could meet and defeat the larger North Korean Army inside North Korea. Granted, it’s quite possible that given the Sino-Soviet War and the fighting in Europe the South Koreans would be counting on the North Koreans being cut off from resupply and reinforcement by the Soviets and the Chinese. This is probably a reasonable assumption. However, the fact remains that moving north and digging the North Koreans out of their defensive positions is a completely different task than defending South Korea against invasion. All of the defensive advantages that might accrue to the ROK in the latter case would be turned around on invading South Korean forces.

It’s also hard to believe (though not impossible to believe) that the US would have been kept in the dark regarding this possibility. Would the US really have given permission for this? In geopolitical terms, the risk to the US would be very, very real. A US client state invades a Soviet client state in 1996; when the going gets tough for the West Germans, the US intervenes. A repeat of this process someplace else in the world can’t help but agitate the Soviets to the highest degree. It would be very hard to imagine that the Kremlin would not see US actions in Europe and Korea as an attempt to redraw the map of Eurasia by means of exploiting Soviet reverses of fortune in China. In short, a ROK invasion of North Korea might push the Soviets over the edge. The only reason to risk it would be if the South Koreans had a very good chance of pulling it off. This does not seem likely; nor do events as portrayed in the US Army Vehicle Guide seem to support this thesis.

Far more likely, I think, is a North Korean bid to get a quick victory while the US is involved in Europe. Who knows what the Soviets promised them. A nuclear guarantee, perhaps? The North Koreans invade, push the Allies back, and stall. They lose huge numbers of men and lots and lots of materiel. The US focuses its efforts on Europe and slowly builds strength in Korea until offensive operations appear feasible. In the meantime, the USAF hits strategic targets in North Korea to keep them from replacing their losses in equipment. Then the Allies push forward in an attempt to reach the Yalu and thereby knock a Soviet ally and first-rate headache out of the war for good.