[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Raellus

However, your version seems to account only for 2 MarDiv and the 8th MID. What about the rest of XI Corps and III German Corps?

The Marines had to have landed in advance of the main force, otherwise what's the point of them landing at all? The objectives I've listed are really only their first stage - perhaps just the first week or so. Once reinforcements arrived, the situation would have been reassessed and the Corps commander, guided by the wishes of the German III Army commander, would have re-tasked them, perhaps even taken them back on board the ships and redeployed them further along the coast.

As we know, it's extremely unlikely any units other than the 8th ID would have made it that far east, at least not in any significant numbers. My assessment of the overall offensive, first posted back in 2008 details the reasons behind that.

We also know from the 8th ID entry in the US Army Vehicle Guide (V1) that the 8th ID was detached from the XI Corp.

In the summer of 2000, the division was detached from the corps and made its way overland through northern Poland to Latvia.

Note it was detached before it moved through northern Poland which says to me it left the rest of the corps behind it in western Poland.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Here's a map I made of unit dispositions in Poland during the summer 2000 (before the disaster at Kalisz). You'll have to zoom in on the AO.

I've got grave doubts about those locations. The more I dig, the more I research, the more I believe the offensive started before June 2000. The 5th ID "jumping off point" of the area of Chojnice and Czluchow seems to have been simply where they were as of that date. There's a good chance in my mind at least that they had actually started the year further westwards and their June location was simply where they where at the beginning of their next phase of the offensive.

The United States 5th Infantry Division (Mechanised) jumped off on its raid on June 19th from Chojnice and Czluchow in a converging drive on the Bydgoszcz and Torun area

I could well be wrong, but why would they be so far out from friendly lines and surrounded by hostile forces otherwise?

And, as I've mentioned before on numerous occasions, the positions shown on the map in the 2.x BYB simply don't add up. Some locations are pre-offensive, some post, some don't even match up with information from other references. Basically, the whole map seems to be drawn up for the players benefit and includes a number of wild guesses as borne out by close examination of Intel Estimate 142 in conjunction with the vehicle guides.

So, to summarise, the US 2nd Marines would have had to plan on taking only what they could hold on to until XI Corps linked up with them, and they'd have to do it without the help of air power or any sort (beyond maybe an occasional flight), satellite and aerial recon, decent electronic surveillance, etc. They'd be back to using the intelligence assets of pre-WWI and remnants of modern tech, as well as being restricted in their ability to quickly redeploy military assets in response to enemy activity.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Even leaving German III Corps out of the picture entirely, U.S. XI Corps, with the U.S. 50th TD, 116th ACR, 8th MID, and Canadian 4th MB (4600 men & 67 tanks), attacking east, could deal with the Polish units East of Gydnia (5900 men and 10 tanks). The Marines (4000;8), given the proper sealift capacity, would be able to launch amphibious assaults deep in the Pact rear. In my scenario, some of 2 MarDiv (all the tanks and at least a regiment) also attacks overland with the rest of XI Corps- that's 5600 men and 75 tanks against 5900 men and only 10 tanks.

Note my comments about pre-offensive dispositions.
The same can be said for enemy strengths.

Looking at the available information, it's clear the NATO commanders saw the Baltic coast and it's Polish defenders as a weak point in the PACT defences, however the PACT commanders had to have known something NATO didn't, otherwise why would they have left such an obvious hole in the line? It's very possible the Poles were equipped with numerous anti-armour weapons, numbered more than is shown in the books, had a few more tanks than shown, or a number of other factors all which caused the bulk of the XI Corps to become bogged down. As has been discussed in the past years, the NATO reliance on fuel may have played into the Poles hands. Heavy, armoured units have to stop every few days or so to brew fuel - cavalry, while slower in the short term and unable to carry as much heavy weaponry, can run rings around tanks and APCs with only fumes in their tanks, avoiding the heavy guns and slicing into the infantry and rear areas.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Also, given the dubious loyalty of some of the Polish units in the AO (the Polish 1st Tank Army declares for the PFC by winter), I think III Corps intel was counting on some of the Polish units not putting up much of a fight.

Doubtful.
No commander in their right mind would include the hope of the enemy switching sides or melting away in their plans. It's an invitation to disaster.

Originally Posted by Raellus

The goal of the XI Corps offensive, in my mind, is to cut off the Polish units in the Penninsula (that's my vision) and launch raids deep into Pact territory (that's canon). It's essentially a single envelopment attack, with XI Corps slashing across the base of the Penninsula, while German III Corps attacks east, protecting its flank. The raids (5th MID & 8th MID) are intended to sow confusion and create panic.

That could work, and I'm of a similar opinion, however we can't be 100% positive of the pre-offensive positions of any unit. Most we have a fairly good idea about, but for some it's a crap shoot.

Originally Posted by Raellus

How/where did you come up with the figure of 1,300 Marines acting as support personnel? Is this a personal inference or is it based on canon? Personally, I interpret the unit strength figures given by canon as combat power- logistics and support personnel are not included in the numbers given. By 2000 most logistical and support duties would be handled by local personnel supervised by troops no longer capable of front-line duty (amputees & such). Units by 2000 would be a lot leaner than they are today and, since they're already quite small (a division of 1000 men?), if you make some of them into support troops, you're left with even less combat power.

As mentioned a few days back, I've been working on the 2nd Marines for a while now. I've carried out intensive research into the organisation and requirements of a marine unit and it's become fairly clear to me that 1300 give or take 200 is a fair figure for T2K.
We know from canon materials, specifically The Ruins of Warsaw that the listed number of troops of a unit is indeed the full number of ALL members of that unit. The SOV 10th GTD has a listed strength of 300 and we have the breakdown in that book to show exactly what's going on, right down to individual members.
We also have The Black Madonna detailing the Czech 14th MRD, 1st AAB, 3rd BGB, and SOV 129th MRD which clearly indicates the inclusion of support personnel in the total troop numbers.

Getting back to the Marines, given the poor state of naval forces in T2K, it's a fair assumption that amphibious assets simply aren't available to transport more than the 4,000 troops and their vehicles in 2000 for an amphibious landing. If there were port facilities available, perhaps, but across the beaches and up the rivers? I think not.
This may well be part of the reason the German Marine units were not included in the landing(s) - they were held back to act as a reserve marine force and would use the same ships which had earlier landed the US Marines.