ArmySGT wrote:
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The explanation for the lacking Soviet response is that the surprise was total and the Soviet Premier and High Command were out of position.
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Sorry.
That's a crappy explanation in our timeline, and not much better in the TM1-1 one.
As previously noted - as soon as the U.S. ICBMs lifted off, the early warning satellites would have detected them.
We know from the Petrov incident that individual missile launches could be detected, let alone the large fraction of the 1,000 available ICBMs that would have been part of the U.S. first strike.
The General Secretary, Defense Minister and chief of the General Staff were required to have access to launch codes 24/7, like the U.S. President's 'football'.
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The response came from "Dead Hand".
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Which would have been activated shortly after the SLBMs landed if we're trying to minimise possible Soviet response time i.e. U.S. first strike was with SLBMs.
Mikeo80 wrote:
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And maybe, just maybe, our first strike actually worked to some extent.
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It wouldn't have in our world. The other side had launch on warning capability.
The TM1-1 alt-history is very different - the Soviets got bio-ICBM warheads to operational status - but their early warning capability matured quickly in the 1970s and early 1980s. I just can't see it being radically different from what actually got deployed.
The two superpowers attained effective parity of strategic nuclear forces in the 1980s.
Prior to this the U.S. had the larger and far more advanced force.
Either side could produce a global catastrophe in their own right.
Rob