The Beginning, Part I
The beginning of the First World War can be traced all the way back to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the inter-war reaction by the French to their defeat and the responses of the Germans to meet France’s constantly shifting war plans.
France declared war on Prussia on 19 July, 1870, which in turn, caused the German states allied with Prussia to declare war on France. While France (with Bismarck’s skillful encouragement), declared war, it had no plan of action. As one reporter pointed out “it hardly made any sense to declare war without then launching an invasion.”
Three weeks after their declaration of war, the French were still gathering their forces on their frontier. The initial battles of August: Wissembourg (Aug 4), Worth (Aug 6) and Spicheren (Aug 6) were fought either on the frontier or inside France. Following its defeat in all three of these engagements, the French Army of of the Northeast fell back on Chalons, on the Marne River to the southeast of Reims. On August 15th, the French Army of the Center was defeated at Vionville and then again, on the 18th at Gravelotte, both small towns to the west of Metz.
The remaining French troops fell back on Metz and regrouped, waiting for reinforcements. When the Germans defeated the reinforcements at Beaumont on August 30th, General MacMahon left a garrison at Metz (under General Bazaine) and fell back on Sedan. There, in September, at what both sides believed would be the decisive battle of the war. Unlike Metz, Sedan is a city located in a bowl and the French troops penned up there were helpless. France’s Emperor, Napoleon III, was forced the surrender along with most of what was left of France’s army.
Following its humiliating surrender, and the loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and with the formation of the German Empire, in the years following 1870, France had three aims:
1) To develop its capability to mount an effective defense of the frontier.
2) To strengthen France militarily through alliances.
3) To develop a loyal and effective military,
France’s efforts in developing its first goal were impressive. A belt of fortifications was built that would protect the 18070 borders from invasion and allow time for France to mobilize its army. Over the next thirty years, starting with the staggering sum of 88,000,000 francs in 1874, France poured money into its fortifications. By 1914, there were over one hundred independent forts on the northeast frontier alone and the Belgians mounted a parallel effort to insure their neutrality in the event of another war by encircling their three strategic cities of Namur, Liege and Antwerp by over forty forts.
These main forts were supplemented by dozens of small reinforced structures, called fortins or ouvarges, and carefully sited so as to dominate the terrain. The French encircled key cities at critical transportation junctures with more fortifications. From north to southeast, the cities of Lille, Maubeuge, Reims, Verdun, Toul, Epinal and Belfort were turned into places fortifiees (fortified positions). Verdun, for example, was the administrative center of a two-hundred square kilometer area protected by twenty forts and some forty ouvrages.
The most important path into France lay along the Meuse River, which begins in the Vosges Mountain near Switzerland and runs up through France and Belgium into Holland. Major rail and road links an alongside, and the river itself, and its connecting canals, was an important transportation artery. In Belgium, the fortified areas surrounding Liege and Namur sat astride the Meuse, as did Verdun. But from Verdun on down the river, there were no fewer than twelve forts sited on the heights of the Meuse, guarding the major crossings.
Below Verdun was another stretch of forts along the Meuse and the Moselle. This area, the plain of the Woevre, was considered by the French to be a swamp as unsuitable for maneuver as the Argonne. And from Epinal on down to Belfort, the forts formed a dense barrier. The Germans would have to advance out of heavily forested areas (the Ardennes and the Argonne), try to move through the passes of the Vosges Mountains, maneuver through major urban areas (such as Nancy) or mount a direct attack on one of the fortified areas.
All of these choices would force the Germans to move slowly, over ground covered by entrenched defenders, equipped with modern weapons and backed by one of the largest artillery parks in Europe. And while the Germans fought their way through the frontier, France would be able to mobilize its field army.
Source “The Myth of the Great War”
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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