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In spite of its numbers, the French Army had serious problems. With over thirty years of no major war, the army had forgotten the basics. In the 1911 maneuvers, Joffre observed the following:

“The infantry hardly maneuvering, demonstrated the gaps in their instruction, the fronts of attack were disproportionate to the means at hand, the ground badly used. The artillery and the infantry did not look for a way to coordinate their efforts… In sum, the mass of the army, for a long time maintained in the defensive mold, and neither the doctrine nor instruction.”

While the French maintained a large artillery park, the vast majority of its weapons were older models, better suited for deployment in fortifications; one example the 1878 270mm mortar weighed twenty metric tons and had to be shipped to its position in pieces and then hand assembled, a process that took days.

The pride of the French artillery was the 75mm field gun of 1898. This piece, coupled with the newly developed hydraulic recoil mechanism was much lighter (thus easier to deploy) and enjoyed a high rate of fire (15-20rpm). Unlike the older guns, the 75mm did not have to be resited after each shot, allowing it to be more accurate. This meant that a battery of 75mms could saturate a one hundred meter target with over a hundred shells in a minute. Older guns would be lucky to have two shots in the same target area. As excellent a weapon as the 75mm turned out to be, it still fired a fairly light shell (some 3kg), it is in the realm of medium and heavy artillery that the French lacked numbers.

Joffre did his best to develop howitzers for the army, but the technical bureaus reported to the Minister of War, not the Chief of Staff, and they refused to develop the 105mm howitzer to complement the 75mm gun. There was also the issue of ammunition supply, the Balkan wars had soon the military observers that shells would be fired at a rate far beyond what had been previously calculated. But the budget was controlled by the Minister, who was advised that ammunition stocks were adequate.

During the period of 1911-1014, Joffre was turned down for every request he made, from mobile field kitchens to new uniforms. The French Army went into the war wearing the red pants and blue jackets of the 1870s, because the Chamber of Ministers would not spend any money for new uniforms. The French solder went into battle with no hot meal, because the Chamber had decide that field kitchens were a waste of money.

Not only did the French Army lack an offensive doctrine and decent equipment, it went into battle with a shortage of officers. In 1914, General Weygand estimated that the army was short eight hundred lieutenants, but any examination of the documents suggest that the actual number was much, much higher. One division had only sixteen of its sixty lieutenants, and half of its sub and reserve lieutenants.

Admissions to military schools were down, the pay of officers and enlisted was miserable and promotions were held up indefinitely or blocked owing to politics. Emil Driant, who would be the first senior officer to fall at Verdun in 1916, had graduated fifth in his class at Saint Cyr in 1875, had served in three Tunisian campaigns and had commanded the elite first battalion of Chasseurs a Pied in 1899---and was then summarily retired, as had the misfortune of having married General Boulanger’s daughter.

The government persecuted Roman Catholics in the officer class with the same fanaticism that members of that class had persecuted Dreyfuss. Senior officers were ordered to report those officers serving who went to Mass. Then Colonel Petain, alleged, responded by saying that as he sat in the front row, he had no idea of who sat behind him. A response that infuriated both the left and right alike.

As anarchy descended on the army, to further the army’s woes, its professional officers fragmented into small groups, to such an extent that there was even a name for them, chapelles. On 22 January, 1919, General Fayolle had dinner with Colonel Rimailho (a noted gunnery expert) and General Saint-Clair-Deville. Rimailho and Saint-Clair-Deville showed Fayolle photos of some of the innovations that they had come up with during the war. When asked why these weapons were not adopted, Rimailho responded, “Rivalries among the chapelles.”

Each chapelle, had its own ideas, carefully nurtured and protected from outside influence. One chapelle favored the cult of the offense; another the power of field artillery. Would the war be long or short, decided by cavalry or the bayonet, by magazine rifles or shrapnel? And who would be the most qualified to lead? For each viewpoint, there was a chapelle, each one ready to fight to the death to preserve its viewpoint.


Source “The Myth of the Great War”