Quote:
Originally Posted by Graebarde
This thread title made me start thinking about HOW are some of the units supported by 2000. The one are in particular is the CentCom area. It's DESERT that relys on irrigation for it's meager output. I just can not see how the large force in the Gulf region is subsisting. There can't be THAT many goats left by 2000. Everyone is geared to the amount of fuel the area still has for the equipment (something I find hard to swallow sometimes too in light of the TDM nuclear exchange that targeted refineries) but NEVER the fuel for the two legged boots on the ground. Ideas?
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When you plug the logistical numbers into the situation, it becomes really hard. Here are some details from "How to Make War"
On average a soldier requires 100 pounds of supplies per day, a sailor requires about 600 pounds per day and a airman requires about 1,000lbs a day.
To move one ton of supplies via rail requires 14 ounces of fuel per 100 kilometers travelled. To move one ton of supplies via ship requires 7 ounces of fuel per 100 kilometers. Move one ton of supplies by truck, then one percent of the weight moved will be consumed as fuel for each 100 kilometers. By air, that same ton of supplies will require 2-5% to be consuemd as fuel per 100 kilometers. Helicopters are even worse as they can cinsume 10% of their cargo weight in fuel for every 100 kilometers. Moving supplies by animal or human will have the same cost as aircraft due to the fuel required.
The US military normally tries to keep between 30-90 days of supply on hand, just in case of any problems with the supply lines.
A typical NATO division will maintain 3-5 days of supplies in the division trains. This breaks down into food, fuel, ammo and general. A 15,000 man division would therefore have (for five days) about 300 tons of foodstuffs, 25,500 tons of ammunition, 25,500 tons of fuel and about 375 tons of general supplies.
The placement of these supplies is critical, they must be positioned close by roads, railroads or have water access due to the sheer volume of traffic in and out. To make matters worse, ammunition and fuel are perishable. You cannot store fuel for more than a year before it starts to break down checmically, ditto for explosives (they deteriorate and become unreliable over the sourse of several years). NATO gets around this by shooting more often in peacetime and maintaining between 30-45 days of stocks. The Soviets maintain larger stockpiles of up to 90 days. Some intresting facts have started to filter from behind the wall, most Soviet ammo had
MAJOR manufacturing issues, it is believed that their failure rate would have exceeded 50%.
One of the little known facts about logistics, is that the smart players try to obtain their supplies locally. Living off the land may have worked in the past, but it must be organized and conducted in an efficient manner in order to avoid starving the locals and creating ore problems for the soldiers. A nearyby country with a strong local economy is a priceless advantage. An example is the Korean War when Japan produced much of the material that UN forces needed.
When you add the Air Force and the Navy, the situation gets even worse. On average, to fly one combat mission, by one aircraft can take hundreds of man-hours and up to 20 tons of supplies. In an initial surge of combat, the fighters can expect to fly three sorties, 300 sorties translates into 4,000 tons of supplies, for every day of combat. A aircraft carrier stores enough materail to support 1,000 sorties and a carrier and its attached air wing can consume 5,000 tons of supplies in a single day.
Lack of supply slows down the tempo of combat, leading to fewer casualties. Lack of mobility prevents units from getting into the fighting. In order to maintain combat power, units will start to strip and abandon excess vehicles, which starts a vicious cycle as the abandonment of trucks will soon lead to nothing available to tranport what supplies do exist.