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By the end of December 1941, the U.S. had activated 29 infantry, five armored and two cavalry divisions. Of these, only two were deployed outside the continental United States, the remaining 34 were all short of equipment and only 17 had received sufficient training to be considered ready for combat (had all of the necessary equipment been pooled, then there would have been enough equipment to equip five infantry and two armored divisions). The initial plan (the Victory Plan) called for an army of 200 divisions, with an immediate target set to raise 72 divisions by the end of 1942.

The original mobilization and expansion plan had been carefully worked out in the inter-war years, in its simplest terms it had the following main features:

a. Regular Army units would be brought up to full TO&E scales.

b. The National Guard would be inducted into Federal service and its units brought up to full TO&E strength.

c. The Organized Reserve would be activated.

d. The training cadre for each of these new units would be drawn from existing units.

e. Enlisted and new units would be brought up to full strength by voluntary recruitment or draft and before assignment would be brought through a basic training course at replacement training centers.

f. Officers for these new units would be drawn mainly from the Officer’s Reserve Corps to supplement the cadre officers.

g. Armies would be brought to full strength and activity and would be responsible for the preparation of tactical units for combat.

h. A General Headquarters, United States Army, would be activated as the high command of the field forces.

By July 1940, the nucleus of a General Headquarters had been established with the initial task of organizing and training the field forces within the continental Untied States. This meant that General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, now assumed a second major post, as Commanding General of the Field Forces. This was a formal appointment only and the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Major General Lesley J. McNair exercised day-to-day control (on Marshall’s behalf). General McNair was a strong opponent of too much specialization, believing that “special” units usually lacked basic military skills. He also hated the waste of men and material and was especially watchful and highly suspicious of any proposed changes to the Tables of Organization and Equipment.

The War Department planned to activate three to four divisions each month, starting in March, 1942. It would use the cadre system with experienced personnel being drawn from an existing division to form the organizing and training nucleus of a new one. These cadre had to attend special training at the service schools, while the divisional commander and his staff had to attend the Command and General Staff School. Most of the remaining officers would be assigned, directly from the officer candidate schools and the enlisted men from replacement training centers. General McNair opposed this policy as he felt that the new divisions should be built upon men who had just finished their basic training, but the sheer scale of the expansion plan meant that this was impossible to achieve. The War Department allowed only 10-12 months for a division to be formed, staffed, equipped and trained to combat readiness. This period consisted of 17 weeks for establishing the initial organization and completing basic training; 13 weeks for unit training up to regimental level and 14 weeks of combined arms tactical training, to include at least one divisional level exercise.

With such a tight schedule, problems soon emerged. There were severe equipment shortages, so that divisions would be activated with insufficient equipment for proper and realistic training. A system of priorities were worked out, with the categories A, B and C being allocated to the divisions. Those due for immediate shipment to a combat zone received Priority A (their full TO&E organization of personnel and equipment). Priority B units received up to 50% of their authorized RO&E and Priority C units were at 25% or less of their authorized TO&E. On numerous occasions, divisions would receive their A priority so close to their embarkation date, that they did not have time to train with their new equipment. In spite of these problems, the mobilization proceeded at a murderous pace and by the end of 1942, virtually all of the ground combat units had been mobilized. All told, the Army mobilized only 91 divisions (compared to 313 for the Germans, 120 Japanese, 550 Russian and 50 British), just under 50% of the original GHQ estimates. However, these divisions were all maintained up to strength throughout the war, in spite of heavy casualties, a major achievement when the student realizes that by early 1945, 57 infantry regiments in 19 different divisions had suffered between 100% and 200% casualties! With only three exceptions, none of the divisions activated after Pearl Harbor saw combat prior to 1944.