Higher Organization, Chapter Four
When General Marshall assumed his position of Chief of Staff in 1939, the Army was operating under its inter-war organization and plans, both of which were hopelessly antiqued. During the 1920s-30, the War Department had operated under the assumption that any future war would be fought in a manner similar to that of World War One, thus using similar command and management techniques. Needless to say, this theory was wrong. One of General Marshall’s first tasks was to adopt the Army’s pre-war structure to a constantly changing world situation. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, General Marshall was even more determined to discard the creaking, old-fashioned structure and create a new one which would be capable of dealing with modern, global war.
Among the many assumptions of the pre-war War Department was that any war would be fought in a single theater of operations and that the Chief of Staff would automatically take to the field as Commander in Chief. It was also anticipated that the President and the Secretary of War would follow the Great War practice and delegate their authority to the professional military officers. This as latter assumption could not have been more wrong as President Roosevelt, in his role of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, chose to play an active part in directing the military. Indeed, General Marshall soon found himself in the role of the President’s advisor on military strategy and operations.
By the end of June 1943, the Army had expanded to over 5,000,000 men. This unbelievable expansion caused a fundamental reorientation within the War Department and they way in which it conducting its business. Various services and supply agencies had to be integrated into the command organization, in order to insure the efficient assembling in the U.S. of all the means of waging and its transportation and distribution to the combat areas overseas. This not only required an enormous training organization to train the ever growing new army, but for this to be done in an orderly and efficient manner, centralized under one authority. Early in 1942, after over a year of exhaustive study, a committee headed by General Joseph T. McNarney completed a plan that established three great commands under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff. These were to be known as: the Army Air Forces (AAF), the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and the Services of Supply, latter called the Army Service Forces (ASF). This was approved by the President on March 9, 1942. To give an idea of the scale of these commands, a decision was made in the summer of 1943 to expand the Army to an effective strength of 7,700,000. In 1945, the operating strength was 8,300,000, but this figure included 600,000 ineffectives (500,000 undergoing hospitalization or in the process of being discharged as unfit for active or limited service). Another 100,000 were en-route overseas as replacements, making up the 600,000 total. The following table shows the breakdown of the 7,700,000 effectives between the AAF, the AGF, the ASF and the Theater Forces (personnel directly attached to the theater HQs and the major command installations worldwide):
Army Ground Forces 3,186,000
Army Air Forces 2,340,000
Army Service Forces 1,751,000
Theater Forces 423,000
The Army Air Forces are a work in progress at this time, but a brief look is included. The 1942 reorganization carried previous reorganizations to their logical conclusion, establishing them as an entirely separate command from the ground forces. They now had their own Air Staff, with its own chief, General Henry H. Arnold. It administered its own personnel and training, it organized and supported the combat air forces employed in all theaters of war and exercised considerable influence over both strategic and operational planning. When World War Two began in 1939, the Air Corps had a strength of less than 24,000. By 1945, the Army Air Forces had a strength of nearly 2.4 million. The United States produced nearly a quarter of a million aircraft. Following the end of the war, it would take another two years for the AAF to achieve completely separate and equal status, as the United States Air Force, with General Henry H. Arnold at its first five-star general.
The Army Service Forces have always been the unsung heroes of World War Two. A detailed list of their organization, and units, and indeed, all of their duties would require several books. In summary, they were responsible for the supply, equipping and movement of troops both at home and overseas; for food, clothing, equipment, ammunitions and the medical services; for road, rail and sea transportation; for personnel records and the mail service; they coordinated the production requirements of military munitions in the U.S.; the actual issue of weapons and equipment; plus everything else that affected the efficient and regular maintenance of this equipment; and the steady stream of supplies to all theaters of war. They were also responsible for many aspects of the troop’s morale, such as movies, educational programs and newspapers. Their supply lines extended for over 56,000 miles and they had authority over the seven technical services, eight administrative services, nine corps areas (later called service commands), six ports of embarkation and nine general depots. HQ ASF was responsible for coordinating the work of all this and for the very first time, full recognition was given to the vital importance of logistics and to the tremendous advantages which could be gained by concentrating logistics operations in a single command. How well the ASF fulfilled their mission can be measured by the fact that there were no major supply failures during the course of the war. Troops were successfully transported all over the world and no battle or campaign was lost through a major logistic failure.
For planning purposes and distribution, supplies were broken down into five classes:
Class 1: Those supplies used up at a regular rate, regardless of conditions, principally food.
Class 2: Items (including clothing and weapons) for which there was a laid down scale of entitlement by units and individuals.
Class 3: All classes of petroleum, oils and lubricants, known collectively as POL.
Class 4: A miscellaneous category, used to cover everything not covered elsewhere.
Class 5: Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents.
While the requirements of the different theatres varied with local conditions, it took, on average, 1,600 tons of supplies daily to maintain a divisional slice. This slice consisted of a full strength division, plus a proportional share of all the necessary supporting and service troops, plus two air wing slices, making a total of 500,000 men in all. This 1,600 tons was broken down into: 1,100 tons of all types of dry cargos, 475 tons of POL products and 25 tons of vehicles. Out of this total, 595 tons went to the combat zone for the ground forces, 65 tons for the air forces and 365 tons went into the divisional area. On average each man assigned to Europe received 66.81lbs of supplies per day (67.4lbs in the Pacific). In the ETO, this was broken down into 7.7lbs of rations (6.71lbs in the PTO), 0.426lbs of clothing and equipment (1lb in the PTO), 7.821lbs of construction materials (11.9lbs in the PTO) and 3.64lbs of ammunition (5.14lbs in the PTO).
The Army Ground Forces is the real subject of this paper. During the war HQ AGF administered 230,000 officers and 4,194,000 enlisted men. The AGF suffered 80% of the Army’s battle casualties, took part in more than forty amphibious landings and captured over 3.5 million prisoners. A total of 92 divisions were activated before and during the war. In 1940, there was only eight Regular Army and Philippine divisions active, between 1940 and 1942, another 65 divisions were activated. 90 divisions were prepared for combat and 88 of these were actually committed. In spite of heavy casualties in some divisions, the AGF maintained them all at or near their TO&E strength.
NON DIVISIONAL UNITS, HEADQUARTERS AND THE STAFF
NON DIVISIONAL UNITS
Fewer than half of the tactical troops of the AGF were actually organic to divisions, instead, they were in non divisional combat and service units. On March 31, 1945, the AGF had 1,468,941 personnel assigned to non divisional units and 1,194,398 personnel assigned to divisions. Typically, these non divisional units were grouped at three levels; Corps, Army and GHQ Reserve. In the early years of World War Two, each army and corps had its TO&E organization, for example:
Type Army (July 31, 1942):
Antiaircraft: 1 Brigade
Chemical Warfare: 1 Maintenance Co., 1 Depot Co., 1 Impregnation Co., 1 Lab Co., 3 Decon Cos.
Engineers: 3 General Service Regts, 6 Engnr Bns, 1 Depot Co., 1 Topographical Bn, 1 Water Supply Bn, 4 Lt Ponton Cos., 2 Dump Truck Cos., 1 Camouflage Bn, 1 Maintenance Co., 2 Hvy Ponton Bns.
Medical: 3 Medical regts, 1 Vet Co., 4 Surgical Hospitals, 10 Evac Hospitals, 1Conv Hospital, 1 Lab, 1 Supply Depot.
Military Police: 1 MP Bn
Ordnance: 2 Ammunition Bns, 1 Maintenance Bn
Quartermaster: 3 MM Bns, 1 Motor Trans Co, 1 Trk Regt, 6 Service Bns, 1 Gas Supply Co., 1 Car Co, 1 Depot Co.
Signal: 1 Construction Bn, 1 Photo Co., 1 Pigeon Co., 1 Radar Intercept Co., 1 Operations Bn, 1 Depot Co.
Tank Destroyers: 3 TD Bns
Aviation: 1 Observation Group
Type Corps (July 31, 1942):
Divisions: 3
Antiaircraft: 1 Regt
Chemical Warfare: None
Engineers: 2 Combat Regts, 1 Corps Topographical Co
Medical: 1 Medical Bn
Military Police: 1 MP Co
Ordnance: 1 maintenance Bn
Quartermaster: 2 Trk Cos., 1 MM Coy, 1 Gas Supply Co., 1 Service Co.
Signal: 1 Signal Bn
Tank Destroyers: 5 Bns
Aviation: 4 Observation Squadrons
The AGF was never happy with this rigid system, feeling that the “type” concept set up false preconceptions with regards to tactical and logistical operations. What was needed was a far more flexible system, and while AGF plans were never officially approved, it did go into piecemeal effect in 1943. This plan did away with all organic corps and army troops, and made all non divisional units part of the GHQ Reserve. The only elements retained by corps and army were those over which they needed to exercise proper command, headquarters and signal personnel. Troops were grouped in the smallest and most efficient size possible (usually battalion sized). These units would then be assigned, as needed to the corps and army. Brigade and regimental levels of command were abolished.
In their place was organized the “Group”. Group headquarters were activated in the ratio of one to every four/five battalions. Group headquarters were supposed to avoid administration, being tactical headquarters, being responsible solely for training and combat operations. Battalions would deal directly with army on administrative matters.
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
The United States Army maintained three levels of field command above the division, Corps, Army and Army Group. Twenty eight corps were organized during World War Two, including four converted from armored corps. A listing of all the corps is as follows:
I Corps
Papua; New Guinea; Luzon
I Armored Corps
Casablanca; French Morocco. Deactivated following the TORCH landings.
II Corps
Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Sicily; Naples-Foggia; Rome-Arno; North
Apennines; Po Valley
II Armored Corps
Redesignated as XVIII Corps in 1943
III Corps
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
III Armored Corps
Redesignated as XIX Corps in 1943
IV Corps
Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
IV Armored
Redesignated as XX Corps in 1943
V Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
VI Corps
Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; Southern France; Ardennes-Alsace;
Central Europe
VII Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
VIII Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
IX Corps
Pacific Theater without inscription
X Corps
New Guinea; Southern Philippines; Leyte
XI Corps
New Guinea; Southern Philippines
XII Corps
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XIII Corps
Rhineland; Central Europe
XIV Corps
Guadalcanal; Northern Solomons; Luzon
XV Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XVI Corps
Rhineland; Central Europe
XVIII Airborne Corps
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe. XVIII Corps was redesignated
as XVIII Airborne Corps, August 25, 1944.
XIX Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Central Europe
XX Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XXI Corps
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XXII Corps
Rhineland, Central Europe
XXIII Corps
European Theater without inscription
XXIV Corps
Leyte; Ryukyus
XXXVI Corps
Continental United States (to be deployed with Operation CORNET)
One of the driving purposes of the battalion and group system was to keep down the size of headquarters staffs, reducing the routine administration they had to deal with, thus keeping them as tactical as possible. The TO&E of a Corps Headquarters (January 19,1945) shows that less than 200 men served in the headquarters.
Corps Headquarters
Entire HQ: 196
Commander and Aides: 4
General Staff Section: 60
Engineer Section: 12
Signal Section: 10
Chemical Warfare Section: 5
Adjutant-General’s Section: 28
Inspector-General’s Section: 7
Judge Advocate-General’s Section: 5
Finance Section: 8
Medical Section: 9
Ordnance Section: 18
Quartermaster Section: 9
Special Services Section: 4
Chaplain’s Section: 6
Public Information Section: 11
The Field Army (to give it its full title), was composed of a headquarters, two or more corps as well as the necessary support and service units needed to achieve its mission. Unlike the corps, the army was both a tactical and an administrative organization. In administration and supply, it bypassed corps HQ and to a certain extent, the division as well. It was responsible for the normal distribution of food, fuel and ammunition. The army would push its supply points forward to easily accessible positions for the trucks of the user units. Army personnel would sort and load supplies into unit loads and place them on their trucks. In order to give an idea of the number of administrative units, the following is a listing of units assigned to the US Third Army (November 10, 1943):
Corps: 5
Divisions: 19
Antiaircraft: 2 Brigade HQ, 4 Group HQ, 8 Bns
Armored: 2 Group HQ, 13 Tank bns
Cavalry: 1 Brigade, 3 Mechanized Regts
Chemical: 5 Decon Cos, 1 Depot Co., 2 Chemical Mortar Bns
Engineers: 9 Group HQ, 1 Sep Bn, 24 Combat Bns, 1 Topographic Bn, 1 Water Supply Bn, 2 Camouflage Cos, 1 Depot Co, 1 Depot Trk Co, 3 Lt Equip Cos, 5 Lt Ponton Cos., 5 Maintenance Cos, 4 Treadway Bridge Cos.
Field Artillery: 16 Group Hqs, 4 Observation Bns, 40 Field Artillery Bns
Infantry: 2 Infantry Regiments
Medical: 5 Grp HQ, 2 Ambulance Bns, 9 Medical Bns, 1 Gas Treatment Bn, 2 Ambulance Cos, 14 Clearing Cos, 28 Collection Cos, 1 Depot Co, 1 Sanitary Co, 3 Vet Cos, 6 Evacution Hospitals, 2 Labs, 2 Vet Evac Hospitals
Military Police: 3 MP Bns, 2 MP Cos.
Ordnance: 2 Ammunition Bns, 1 Ordnance Bn, 20 Group HQ, 8 Ammunition Cos, 8 Depot Cops, 2 Evac Cos, 7 Hvy Auto Maint Cos, 10 Hvy maint Cos, 4 Hvy Maint Cos (Tank), 1 Lt maint Co, 1 AA Maint Coy, 19 Med Auto Maint Coys, 13 Med Maint Cos.
Quartermaster: 1 Trk Regt, 13 Group HQ, 2 Gas Supply Bns, 1 Service Bn, 1 Ster Co, 4 Bakery Cos, 3 Car Cos, 4 Depot Cos, 2 Laundry Cos., 6 Pk Trs Cos, 5 Railhead Cos, 1 Salvage Collection Co, 24 Troop Transport Cos, 33 Trk Cos.,
Signal: 6 Signal bns, 2 Construction Bns, 2 Operations Bns, 1 Construction Coy, 1 Depot Co, 2 Pigeon Cos, 1 Photo Coy, 2 Repair Cos, 2 Radio intercept Cos
Tank Destroyers: 7 Group HQ, 21 TD Bns
Miscellaneous: 7 Bands, 14 HQ Special Troops, 1 MRU (fixed), 4 MRU (Mobile)
The Army Headquarters (TO&E of October 26, 1944) had the following assigned personnel:
Entire HQ: 778
Commander and Aides: 7
General Staff Section: 180
Engineer Section: 72
Signal Section: 73
Chemical Warfare Section: 26
Adjutant-General’s Section: 91
Inspector-General’s Section: 18
Judge Advocate-General’s Section: 9
Finance Section: 25
Medical Section: 61
Ordnance Section: 55
Provost Marshal’s Section: 9
Quartermaster Section: 83
Special Services Section: 3
Chaplain’s Section: 7
During the Second World War, the AGD organized eleven armies:
First Army
European Theater of Operations
Second Army
Continental United States (Training)
Third Army
European Theater of Operations
Fourth Army
Continental United States (Training)
Fifth Army
European Theater of Operations
Sixth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Seventh Army
European Theater of Operations
Eighth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Ninth Army
European Theater of Operations
Tenth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Fifteenth Army
European Theater of Operations
The largest headquarters was the army group, which would control several armies. The army group was primarily a tactical headquarters, that eased the burden of the theater commander by reducing the numbers of commanders that he had to directly deal with. During World War Two, the United States Army formed only three army groups: the 12th (General Omar N. Bradley); the 6th (General Jacob L. Devers) and the 15th (General Mark W. Clark).
Only one superior headquarters was ever established to control the Army Groups, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHEAF) was commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower and commanded the Allied military efforts in the ETO. At its peak, SHEAF had some 6,000 personnel assigned.
THE STAFF
At the top of any of the major headquarters was the commanding general; normally a major general commanded a corps, a lieutenant general an army and a full general an army group, but this pattern was not always followed. No matter his rank, the commander was ultimately responsible for everything that went on in his command. He was assisted by his Chief of Staff (COS) who was the chief assistant and the coordinator of the staff. The COS had, in turn, a deputy chief of staff. Beneath them were the staff, who were comprised of two groups (and their responsibilities):
The General Staff:
Chief of Staff; G-1 Personnel; G-2 Intelligence; G-3 Operations; G-4 Supply and G-5 Civil Affairs and Military Government.
The Special Staff:
Adjutant-General; Artillery; Antiaircraft; Chaplain; Chemical Warfare; Engineer; Finance; HQ Commandant; Inspector-General; Judge Advocate; Medical; Ordnance; Provost Marshal; Public Relations; Quartermaster; Signal; Special Services and Tank Destroyers.
Each of the General Staff sections, at army level, was lead by an assistant chief of staff in the rank of colonel. The Special Staff sections was led by either a colonel or a lieutenant-colonel.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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