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“Armor as the ground arm of mobility, emerged from World War II with a lion’s share of the credit for the Allied victory. Indeed armor enthusiasts at that time regarded the tank as being the main weapon of the land army" (US Army Lineage Series: Armor-Cavalry).

The first armored formations larger than brigades were formed on July 15, 1940 when the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions were activated. The Armored Force was expanded by 3 additional divisions in 1941; nine in 1942 and two in 1943. The initial divisional organization was tank-heavy, with one three regiment armored brigade (a total of 6 light and 3 medium battalions, with 368 tanks) and a single two battalion armored infantry regiment. Field tests and reports on early operations soon proved that this organization was too cumbersome and efforts to streamline the armored division began. The March 1, 1942 reorganization replaced the armored brigade with two “combat command” headquarters, armored strength was reduced to two three-battalion regiments (with one light and two medium tank battalions each) and the armored infantry regiment was expanded to three battalions. This became known as the “heavy” armored division. Combat experience resulted in another major organizational change on September 15, 1943. The existing heavy armored divisions were reorganized to the new “light” division organization. By August 1944, all armored divisions were organized as lights, except for the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions, which retained the heavy organization. All tank battalions in the light divisions and in the separate tank battalions were organized similarly, in theory, they were interchangeable, in practice, they never were exchanged.

The light armored division was organized with a Divisional Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two Combat Command Headquarters (known as CCA and CCB), a Reserve Combat Command (CCR), three tank battalions (each of one light and three medium tank companies), three armored infantry battalions, thee armored field artillery battalions, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron, an armored engineer battalion as well as divisional services. The division was commanded by a major general, the combat commands by a brigadier general (the assistant division commander) and two colonels. The division included 77 light tanks, 168 medium tanks, 18 assault guns, 17 M-8 HMC, 54 M-7 HMC and 54 armored cars. Total personnel strength was 10,754 men.

The heavy division organization was almost the same, except that the three tank battalions were replaced by two three-battalion tank regiments (first battalion was made up of three light tank companies and the second and third battalions each had three medium tank companies) and the three armored infantry battalions were organized as a regiment under a single regimental headquarters. While the light division had 3 light and 9 medium tank companies, the heavy had 6 light and 12 medium tank companies. The heavy division’s equipment included 158 light tanks, 232 medium tanks, 25 assault guns, 17 M-8 HMC, 54 M-7 HMC, and 79 armored cars. Total personnel strength was 14,664 men.

Separate tank battalions were standardized as medium battalions, which were identical to those in the light armored division or as light battalions, which were identical to the light tank battalions of the heavy armored division. The medium tank battalions fielded 17 light tanks, 54 medium tanks, and 6 assault guns. Personnel strength was 724. The light tank battalion of three companies, fielded 56 light tanks and 3 M-8 HMC. Personnel strength was 532 men.

Normally, one armored division was assigned to a corps. An additional armored group headquarters would be assigned to control any separate tank battalions assigned to the corps. In practice, the massing of these separate battalions was rarely done in the ETO, the armored groups were therefore administrative units only, although ETO practice was to assign these organizations to the armored divisions to augment the capabilities of the combat commands.

Theoretically, armored divisions were to act as the maneuver reserve for the corps and were to be employed to break through enemy fronts ruptured by the infantry divisions. The armored division was then to be used to conduct deep pursuit of the enemy once the front was broken through. In practice, the width of the front meant that armored divisions were often used in defensive roles, for which they were not designed. A critical weakness was the fact that the infantry component of the division was too small to withstand the attrition of long-term defense or offensive missions.

In spite of its flaws, the flexible organization of the armored division permitted it to be adopted to may situations. Typically, CCA and CCB acted as headquarters to which battalion task forces were assigned. US armored tactics stressed the combined arms approach. Cross-attachments of tank and infantry companies into battalion task forces and company combat teams were a routine practice. While the Reserve Combat Command was not intended as a combat unit, with the addition of an armored group headquarters, CCR was often used as a third combat element.

Forty separate armored battalions served in the ETO. They were normally assigned on the basis of one per infantry division. However, not all infantry divisions had a tank battalion attached. In theory tank battalions could be assigned to an armored group headquarters, in practice, this was seldom done. Usually when a separate tank battalion was assigned to an infantry division, it retained that affiliation throughout the war. As a result, many infantry divisions developed a high degree of coordination with their associated tank battalions.

The standard US medium tank was the M-4 Sherman. The Sherman was designed in April 1941 and the first prototype was completed that September. Following testing, it was standardized for production in October 1941 with production beginning in early 1942. At the time, the Sherman was highly advanced; however, under the drive of wartime experience, tank design was evolving rapidly; thus the armor and firepower of the Sherman, adequate for the conditions of 1942 and 1943, were insufficient by 1944. The tank was originally designed with a short-barreled, medium-velocity 75mm gun. The armor piercing capability of this piece was adequate to penetrate the German PzKpfw MkIII and MkIV at the time, As the new Panther tank entered production, the Sherman could knock out the tank by attacking from the flanks and rear, its frontal armor was impervious to the 75mm APC round. The Tiger could only be destroyed by firing into its rear.

By late 1944, the 75mm gun was being replaced by a long-barreled, high-velocity 75mm gun (commonly called the 76mm) with good penetration and increased accuracy. But supplies of the up-gunned Sherman were short and the older 75mm gun remained in service until the end of the war. The combination of weak armor protection, and a poor gun was only partially made up for by the Sherman’s mechanical reliability, its high speed electric-hydraulic turret traverse and its numbers.

A number of Shermans were designed or specially equipped for specialized roles. These included standard M-4s equipped with dozer blades, mine-clearing tanks, recovery vehicles and an assault gun variant armed with a 105mm howitzer. Six M-4 assault guns were assigned to the assault gun platoon of the standard tank battalion headquarters company. A important variant was the M-4A3E2 “Jumbo”. This was a standard M-4 that was fitted with additional armor, substantially increasing its protection. The Jumbo was, in fact, better protected than the German Panther, although the Panther was fitted with a superior cannon. The M-4A3E2 was built in limited numbers (254). In the ETO, Ordnance workshops, working with armor plate produced by French steel mills or with salvaged armor, converted a number of M-4s to the Jumbo standard. It is uncertain exactly how many were available in Europe (Third Army workshops alone converted some 200 Shermans by December 1944), but, despite their small numbers, the Jumbo helped even the odds in tank-vs.-tank combat. The Jumbos were scattered throughout the ETO; Most of the armored divisions had 20-30; separate tank battalions would field a platoon of 4-5.

The standard light tank was the M-5 Stuart. It mounted a 37mm cannon and was lightly armored. Like the M-4, the M-5 had a number of variants, most important of which was a Howitzer Motor Carriage. The M-8 HMC was equipped with a 75mm howitzer and was found in the cavalry reconnaissance squadrons and in the armored infantry battalions. The usefulness of the M-5 had long been in question and it was slowly being replaced by the M-24 Chaffee, which had heavier armor and a 75mm cannon. Those units equipped with the Stuart were mostly used as reconnaissance units or as escorts for convoys. So light was the Stuart’s armor, and so underpowered was its 37mm gun, that they were seldom deployed in the front line.