I have maintained for a few years that the NATO plan (meaning the official policy of the White House) was in keeping with the proposed NATO war aims of General Sir John Hackett’s The Third World War. Specifically, the goal was to occupy the USSR west of the Dvina-Dnepr line, effectively knocking the Soviet Union out of the war whether they came to terms or not.
Theoretically, this plan had a number of advantages. By occupying the westernmost slice of the Soviet Union, NATO effectively would liberate all of Eastern Europe (whether the other members of the Warsaw Pact wanted to be liberated or not). Much Ukrainian grain would be denied to the Soviets, along with the industry and raw materials of the occupied areas. All this said, the Soviet Union would not be destroyed outright. Moscow would not be threatened with occupation. The regime could continue to rule the vast Soviet territory; they would be unable to wage offensive war against the West or China in the future, however—especially if a reunited Germany and the liberated Warsaw Pact signatories maintained a military presence in Belarus and the Ukraine.
Of course, reality evolved rather differently. The regime in power in the Kremlin in mid-1997 was worried about a coup or revolution. They were right to worry about these things. Also, no matter how rational the scheme put forth by NATO might have been, it was foolish to allow any German units to cross the Soviet border.
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“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
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