[Webstral]

The timing of the first Soviet actions against Norway deserves some attention, I think. Frankly, I’ve always chalked it up to editorial error. Nonetheless, the idea merits discussion.

Let’s assume for the moment that the timing of the Soviet offensive into Norway, the initial stages of which predate the first US Army unit crossing into the DDR, is not an editorial error. If the Soviets invade Norway prior to the war with Germany widening into a general war with NATO, what do the Soviets expect to get out of such an action? I believe but can’t reference at the moment that the Soviet invasion of Norway is supposed to begin after 20 NOV 96.

The obvious answer is that they expect to open the door to the North Atlantic so that the Northern Red Banner Fleet can interdict the trans-Atlantic supply route. By invading Norway, the USSR threatens to bring all of NATO into the Pact-German War. At the very least, NATO can be expected to react very strongly. Let’s look at the trans-Atlantic sealift first.

We know that the US Army already has activated REFORGER. Several divisions and independent brigades fly in their personnel, marry up with their equipment in POMCUS sites, and get into the field in good order. The Soviets have missed their opportunity there. Nonetheless, we have good reason to believe that massive resupply for the West Germans takes to the Atlantic as soon as the balloon goes up. Whether the West Germans win or lose, they are going to need major replenishment. By mid-November, we should expect that the Atlantic is full of shipping carrying military cargoes bound for North Sea ports. I wonder whether this shipping is moving in convoys, which would indicate a war footing, or as single ships, which would indicate that the US does not expect to become a belligerent. Either way, the Soviets have a major interest in breaking out into the Northern Atlantic to start sinking ships.

Of course, the Soviets keep a third of their nuclear attack boats at sea at all times in the 1980’s. The Soviets might change this policy somewhat as their economy suffers in the early 1990’s. Also, subs might get concentrated in the Pacific once the Sino-Soviet War gets underway. Still, it’s not unreasonable to believe that a substantial number of Soviet subs are in the North Atlantic in October, 1996. The Kremlin might find cause to up the number of Soviet subs on patrol in the North Atlantic throughout November just in case the US does exactly what the US does. I can’t say how many of these Soviet subs will be tracked and tailed by NATO attack boats and other ASW forces. If the Soviets already have a large number of subs in the North Atlantic by the time the situation on the ground in East Germany begins to turn in favor of the Pact, one wonders what they think they might gain by invading Norway compared to the near certainty of bringing the rest of NATO into the fight—even if only (for the time being) in support of Norway.

We should bear in mind that France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece all denounce the West German invasion of the DDR. We don’t know what Spain and Portugal think of the matter, but I’ve always cast them with France and Italy. If the Soviets invade Norway before France breaks with NATO, then the USSR forces France to live up to her treaty obligations. There’s a chance, of course, that France will renege anyway. However, even for France there’s a difference between pulling out of NATO over active Anglo-American support for a West German war of aggression and failing to come to the defense of a fellow member of NATO who is clearly a victim of Soviet aggression.

We can’t know what diplomatic maneuvering is going on in October and November, 1996. Surely, though, someone in the Soviet chain of command is going to point out to that by mid-November the West Germans are starting to run out of steam. The correlation of forces is working more and more in favor of the Pact in Germany. Several members of NATO are wondering what happened to the defensive organization they joined. Why answer the question for them—above all, France—just to get control of Norway? Until 01DEC 96 (or thereabouts), NATO is not involved in the Pact-German War. Is possession of Norway really worth war with the rest of NATO, which is obliged by treaty to come to Norway’s defense? Does anyone in the Kremlin believe the Soviet-NATO fighting will be limited to Norway? Air and sea operations over Norway inevitably will bleed over into German air and sea space; and then the rest of NATO will be dragged into the fighting in Germany. Someone is going to argue that until the situation in Germany is completely lost, the gain-loss ratio of bringing the rest of NATO into the war is distinctly unfavorable for the Soviet Union.

Someone else is going to argue that the trans-Atlantic pipeline of materiel has to be closed if the Pact forces in Germany are to fight on the best possible terms. There is logic to this. However, balanced against a medium-term (and not guaranteed) throttling of the supply line running from North America to Western Europe is an almost certain entrance of strong, fresh NATO air and ground forces into the fighting in Central Europe.

A good deal depends on the particulars, it must be said. If there ever was a chance to attack the North Atlantic with strategic surprise, by the second week of October the Soviets have missed that opportunity. Nevertheless, we don’t really know what the disposition of NATO naval forces in the North Atlantic is as October turns to November. It’s hard to believe that the US Atlantic Fleet does nothing. At the same time, there isn’t much justification for going to a full war footing. Mobilization and deployment of naval assets probably is somewhere between the two extremes. It’s hard to imagine that the US Navy fails to observe the growing number of Soviet subs in the North Atlantic or fails to implement countermeasures that would amount to putting more ships to sea. Given all this, is the potential gain of a late November offensive in Norway worth the potential cost? I’m inclined to think not.