The West today is in a much better position than the Anglo-French were in 1938-9. Granted, the internal divisions and legislative paralysis being experienced by the US is uncomfortably similar to the French political situation during the run-up to the Battle of France. That much said, NATO is in a better position vis-à-vis Russia. I write this while trying to bear in mind that overconfidence kills.
Regardless of what happens in the Ukraine, NATO includes the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Russian military action against any of these states mandates action by the rest of NATO. Regardless of what one thinks of a particular Western leader, NATO obligations provide a clear-cut cover for military action up to and including full scale mobilization and war—even nuclear war. While I don’t have access to a psychological profile of Putin such that I could make a definitive statement about his willingness to test the commitment of the Western powers to NATO, I’m reasonably confident of the long term outcome of any conventional confrontation between NATO and Russia. (NATO v Russia simultaneously with a US-led alliance against China is a different story, if such a story is relevant to tell.)
I do think the tanks have to go back in. I would go so far as to say that the tanks have to be pushed forward to Poland and Romania. In fact, the whole NATO posture needs to be pushed eastwards at this point—if only to demonstrate that NATO means business about defending all NATO members from extralegal action by outside agents. I’m no more anxious for war than anyone else who has looked war in the eye as a rifleman. That much said, I’m perfectly aware that actions speak louder than words; combat units show a far greater commitment to one’s allies than economic sanctions. We want the Poles, the Balts, the Romanians, and the others to feel completely confident that we will go to the mat for them if that’s the way Russia wants to play. Putin may or may not be moved by the loss of revenues from alienating his European clients. He’s far more likely to be moved by the permanent stationing of a half dozen heavy divisions in Poland and another 2-3 in Romania. This number would be too small to invade Russia, but it would be enough to prevent any sudden and rash acts by Russia. This number is not insuperable when spread amongst the NATO allies.
None of this will be helpful to the Ukraine in the immediate future. I suppose some value might be derived from keeping Putin guessing about what is intended by the push eastward, but the short term effect might actually be to raise the temperature and bolster Putin’s domestic support. So be it. Politicians and diplomats dream of solutions that give them the theoretical maximum reward. Soldiers must be more pragmatic. Putin’s support in Russia can go through roof for all I care, so long as every time he looks at our allies he’s looking down a thicket of 120mm barrels.
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“We’re not innovating. We’re selectively imitating.” June Bernstein, Acting President of the University of Arizona in Tucson, November 15, 1998.
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