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Sources are Omaha A Flawed Victory by Adrian Lewis, D-Day by Steven Ambrose and D-Day by Tute, Costello and Hughes and the 6juin1944.com web site.

Two American Divisions were selected for the assault on Omaha Beach, the 1st Infantry Division “The Big Red One” and the 29th Infantry Division “the Blue and Grey”. The 1st Infantry Division was chosen because, at the time, it was the most experienced U.S. Army division in amphibious operations. This led to the unusual assignment of the 29th Infantry Division as an attachment on D-Day.

Major General Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the 1st ID was therefore responsible for deploying and fighting the assault force. His primary mission was to secure a lodgement through which follow-on forces could then advance. It was his duty to develop the tactical plans that would achieve army and corps objectives and minimize the risks to the lives of his soldiers. While Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley would shoulder the ultimate responsibility for what happened on Bloody Omaha, Huebner deserves credit for what happened on the beach.

Huebner and Gerow (commander US V Corps) were, for the most part in agreement on the concept of the operation. Both staffs worked closely together to develop and troubleshoot the plan, as a result, there was a high degree of consensus between Gerow and Huebner. Both officers fought to have H-Hour moved up to take advantage of the cover of darkness. And both were threatened with relief of their commands if they failed to follow Bradley’s directives. The result of this was that Huebner was given very little latitude in developing the plan for the assault on Omaha Beach. The when, where, who and how---the doctrine--- was dictated to him in considerable detail. So severe was this “oversight from on high”, that one battalion commander complained in his after action report that he had been given no latitude in in determining what equipment his battalion would carry, and as a result, his men went into action carrying gear that they had no need of and left behind gear that they needed.

Huebner was told that he would assault with two regiments abreast, two battalions abreast in each regiment. He was told how to load the landing craft, how to configure his platoons into the new (and untested) boat teams, what equipment each boat team would carry and even how they teams would exit the landing craft. He was given the engineer plan for clearing lanes through the obstacles and the Joint Fire Plan. Any analysis of the landing plan for Omaha Beach finds little or no conformation with standard organizational and doctrinal procedures. No attempt was made to follow lessons learned in previous amphibious landings and not even the basic principle of unit integrity was maintained.

Remember that the 1st Infantry Division was brought into the invasion because it had more experience with amphibious operations than any other division in the ETO. Their very experience was ignored by the planning staffs at First Army. Bradley had his vision of what the invasion would entail, and nothing and no one was allowed to rock the boat.

Huebner was forced to make his tactical plans based on the strategic assumptions of Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley. These assumptions included the erroneous assessment of the firepower of the Army Air Forces, the over-inflated capabilities of the limited naval gunfire support, the erroneous assessments of the German strength, capabilities and concept for the conduct of their defense. It was based on the assumption that tactical surprise would be achieved, and on unproven tactical doctrines, of which the most critical was the ability of the engineers to clear formidable obstacles, in daylight, and under heavy enemy fire. Miscalculations and erroneous information and assumptions caused Huebner to prepare his division to fight the wrong battle, to his enternal credit, Huebner ruthless drilled his men in their individual tasks and on their platoon and company objectives.

As a result of tactical miscalculations of Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley, the 1st Infantry Division were deployed in a manner that failed to maximize their chances of success and survival. They were deployed in a direct frontal assault against heavily dug in German defenders. In World War One, this type of assault failed time and time again, and on June 6, 1944, it almost failed again.

Omaha Beach would see the deployment of two regiments, the 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division was a National Guard unit that had never seen combat, indeed the 29th Infantry Division had been in England for so long (October 1942) that it had earned the nickname “England’s Own”. The only veteran unit would be the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, a unit that seen amphibious assaults in North Africa and Sicily. Both units had undergone training at the Amphibious Training Center at Woolacombe.

In 1944, a Army rifle company consisted of 6 officers and 193 enlisted men. In the company were a headquarters squad of 6 men, three rifle platoons of 41 men each and a weapons platoon of 31 men. During the build up for the Normandy Invasion, there was a great fear that there would not be enough LCVPs available to land all of the troops. The primary consideration was to maximize the load out on the LCVPs and to insure that each landing craft would be loaded with a mixture of men and equipment so that if one or more boats were lost, that each boat team would be able to continue to fight on its own.

Every amphibious assault in World War Two accepted that it was more important to maintain unit integrity than to maximize loads with one glaring exception. The Normandy Invasion threw out that basic principle for an untried boat team concept

The Assault Team was composed of a 5-man rifle section, a 4-man BAR section, a 4-man bazooka section, a 4-man 60mm mortar section, a 4-man wire cutting section, a 2-man flamethrower section and a 4-man demolition section. Each team was commanded by an officer and a NCO. The assault teams were created by mixing the weapons platoon in with the rifle platoons and adding additional personnel. Each assault team was “optimized” to be able to be landed on the beach and attack the fortifications without any support.

The first man off the boat was the officer, he would be followed by the rifle section, which would provide supporting fire with rifle grenades. Then the wire cutting team would advance to any barbed wire and cut a gap with Bangalore Torpedoes and wire cutters. The bazooka section would fan out to either side and fire rockets at any openings in the pillboxes. The BARs and 60mm mortar would provide covering fire while the flamethrower and demolitions sections would assault the fortifications. Last man off would be the NCO.

Six Assault Teams and a Command Boat Team would be formed out of a rifle company.

The weapons company needed its own special organization. It would be organized into five Support Boat Teams and a Command Boat Team. The Support Boat Teams were to land in the second wave, once an area had been secured and set up their heavy weapons. Each team, however, also had the ability to attack fortifications, if necessary. It was comprised of a 5-man rifle team, a 6-man HMG team, a 4-man wire cutting team, a 8-man 81mm mortar team and a 5-man demolitions team as well as an officer and NCO.

The Command Boat Teams averaged 16 men and included the company executive officer. The company commander would land as an extra man in one of the Assault Boat teams. The remainder of the Command Boat Team was filled up with attachments such as the tank battalion liaison team or a Shore Fire Control Party. Two of the seven boats in the rifle company carried a medic.

In addition to its 30-men, each LCVP also carried a 3-man Navy crew as well as additional ammunition and demolition supplies. So overloaded were the LCVPs that their freeboard was reduced to only 1-3-feet. With the heavy waves (4-6 feet), many of the assault craft shipped large amounts of water and even swamped before reaching the beaches.

Another feature of the landings was the overloading of the troops. Many of the soldiers leaving the landing craft were carrying loads of between 60-90 pounds.