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Originally Posted by Webstral
I agree that there are things Russia could do in a hurry. The question would be what it would take to stay there. If Putin could pull off a major diplomatic coup in the wake of an invasion of one or more Baltic Republics, he might be able to get the US to agree to let him keep what he took. This doesn't seem likely, though. The chicken hawks in the US are looking for an excuse to dust off the good stuff that seldom got used in OIF or OEF. Escalation would be virtually unavoidable, given the tiny nature of the Baltic Republics versus the operational range of the aircraft that would be involved. The logic of counter-air pretty quickly would involve combat in the airspace of nations around the Baltics, followed by attacks on air bases, SAM, and ground-based radar in neighboring countries. While one might argue that escalation might be managed by a sort of firewall between aircraft penetrating non-Baltic airspace in prosecution of operations focused on the Baltics and ground forces crossing land borders, the inevitable efforts of USAF SO rescuing pilots would blur the line between rescue and commando operations, which would blur the line further regarding heliborne raids, which might finally lead to cross-border actions by ground forces. Though I'm not Putin, I have a hard time imagining what he thinks he could get out of occupying one or more Baltic Republics compared to the firestorm that could erupt in response.
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Right. But that's where the West's response so far, which in some ways echoes the Appeasement policy of the Great Britain and France leading up to WWII, might be informing Putin's decision-making. So far, he's annexed Crimea and destabilized large chunks of Ukraine without receiving anything harsher than stern warnings and economic sanctions, both of which Putin has pretty much ignored. So far, sanctions have not proven to be an effective deterent. Is he really worried about a NATO military response? Probably, but if his plans in the Ukraine pan out in the not-so-distant future, he may decide that NATO is a paper tiger, all bark and no bight (sorry for the mixed metaphors).
Hilter said something to the effect that if the French military had responded to his reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, he wouldn't have been able to hold it. France's innaction encouraged Hitler to take control of Austria and invade parts of Czechoslovakia and, ultimately Poland. Just four years after he could have been stopped by France, he demolished it.
I have a scenario which I'm almost ready to share here that I think makes a compelling case that Russia could take and hold at least one of the Baltic States (probably Estonia), even with a conventional military response from NATO.
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Originally Posted by stormlion1
One thing to remember about Russia in comparison to the west is they are still producing new Aircraft, Tanks, Helicopters, etc while most NATO nations have stopped producing quite some time ago. Most of that gear is for the export market but it all can be seized before it leaves the country for domestic use. Stalin once said Quantity has a quality all on its own. The Current leadership in Russia I think is taking that lesson to heart. In a non-nuclear war they can flood a battlefield while every piece of NATO gear will be priceless in comparison. Its only the lack of clear allies that stops the Russians from really getting ambitious.
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I totally agree, Stormlion. I've been arguing the numbers game for years. Yeah, an M1A2 is, overall, a better tank than a T-72MB, but if the Russians can field 5-6 T-72MBs for every one M1A1, a rough parity can be achieved. And some of the latest T-90 upgrades are narrowing the qualitative gap.
If NATO shows any cracks, it might serve, in Putin's mind, to mitigate his lack of strong allies. Regardless, he's working to build economic and military alliances with sympathetic or easily bullied nations (see the recent "anti-terrorist" join maneuvers with Serbia and the [economic] Eurasian Union).
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