Quote:
Originally Posted by stormlion1
The problem is we don't have the troops or gear anymore in Europe. It would take months to bring the troops and gear back over. Best case is to do it and stall with talks or go into a war with Europe taking the lead and trying to cross the Atlantic with the gear when we can. Reminds me of a book called Red Storm Rising that does.
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You’ve summarized the core challenge quite nicely. The drawing down of US forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War has only exacerbated the problem that CONUS and Europe are separated by the Atlantic Ocean.
The fashion in which NATO responds to a Russian invasion of Estonia depends to some degree on how the invasion unfolds, I think. For instance, if Russians simply put 50,000 troops (or whatever they deem suitable for the first wave) on the Estonian border, then roll over the little country without any warning to the rest of the world, government and public opinion in NATO will react differently than if there is an extended period of unrest on the part of the Russian minority followed by public statements, negotiation, posturing, incidents, etc. In short, if the Russians successfully cultivate the idea that ethnic Russians in Estonia are suffering under the tyranny of Estonian rule, public opinion in Europe especially is likely to be more favorable than if the Russians simply slap Estonia to the ground and take her purse.
Let’s assume for the moment that the Russians eventually invade and that Estonia resists, if briefly and hopelessly. Obviously, this will trigger treaty obligations on the part of every other member of NATO. NATO’s reaction hinges on the reaction of the United States. The reaction of the United States will depend to some degree on what happens leading up to the invasion and during the invasion. If, for instance, the Russians invade more-or-less out of the blue like Hussein did in Kuwait, the American response won’t involve too much of a personal stake. If, on the other hand, a period of saber rattling prompts the US to put a brigade of paratroopers in Estonia as a show of solidarity with a member of NATO, and if the Russians invade anyway and wipe out a brigade of US troops, the reaction will be more extreme. In the former case, American appeals to reluctant treaty signatories would begin with, “In keeping with the obligations enumerated in the North Atlantic Treaty…” In the latter case, American appeals to reluctant treaty signatories would start with a lapel grab and “Listen good, [expletive deleted]!”
From the Russian standpoint, there are definite advantages to either staying out of Estonia altogether or rolling in unannounced and hoping that sheer surprise and hutzpah carry the day. An extended pre-invasion crisis runs the risk of drawing NATO forces eastward. The longer the Estonians wail about being defenseless in the face of overwhelming Russian force, the greater the likelihood that the POTUS will come under pressure to have SACEUR make some show of force to settle the nerves of the Eastern European members of NATO. The most obvious idea is to send small contingents of troops from several NATO nations to Estonia. Spreading the risk out sends the right signal to everyone, while keeping the numbers small implies a strictly defensive mission. From the Russian point of view, however, the introduction of any NATO combat units into Estonia means that NATO is closer to St. Petersburg and Moscow than ever. Once the NATO troops go in, they are likely to have an extended stay. This reality poses two dangers for Russia. The first is that the viability of an invasion and occupation of Estonia without a major war virtually disappears. To whatever degree the Russians (Putin) believe Estonia can be put in the bag without a war with NATO, that chance diminishes almost to nothing if the Russian invasion force kills, captures, or otherwise drives from the country 500 troops from each the US, UK, FRG, France, Poland, Italy, Canada, etc. On the other hand, the presence of NATO troops so close to St. Petersburg is intensely dangerous. What would be the point of dragging NATO’s forces further east with no other gain anywhere to offset the change in NATO’s dispositions? Once NATO starts fortifying Eastern Europe, there is no telling where it could stop. Several NATO corps in West Germany was bad. Several NATO corps in the Baltics and Poland is much, much worse. And again, the Russians can’t help but be aware that the option of invasion without a major war basically will go off the table if American combat units go into Estonia in ANY quantity and get destroying during a Russian invasion and occupation.
So it seems to me that an invasion out of the blue is the most likely course of action if in fact an invasion is to take place. In addition to having the advantage of not drawing in the rest of NATO as irresistibly, a bolt-from-the-blue invasion would catch the Americans flat footed. The longer a pre-invasion crisis lasts, the greater the opportunity for the Americans to ship a heavy division or two to Europe and stockpile materiel under peacetime conditions. A fait accompli means that the Americans have to start their buildup from the beginning. The same logic applies to the other members of NATO, the mobilization and readiness of each of which should be kept as low as possible leading up to the moment of decision.
At the risk of showing prejudice, I feel obliged to say that the Russians really can be brutes. The argument will be put forward that slapping Estonia to the ground and taking her purse will send the right message to the effete Westerners, the argument will go. They didn’t do anything of substance in the Ukraine. They won’t get involved in Estonia. The US may piss and moan about it, but they are already bogged down with other crises; and in any event, American public opinion won’t stand for a confrontation with Russia on top of ISIL, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. I doubt Putin is foolish enough to put stock in this argument, but one never knows.
Again, duty calls so I will have to get back to this later.