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Old 11-20-2014, 05:58 PM
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Webstral Webstral is offline
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Let us assume for the moment that Putin invades and occupies Estonia with little or no warning and that this action does not involve combat units from any of the other members of NATO. The reaction of the United States to this event is the hinge on which future events turn. The European members of NATO are highly unlikely to do anything of a military nature without the lead of the US. The reaction of the US hinges on where the POTUS leads.

Having brought up Obama, I will post a disclaimer. I’m not interested in anyone’s opinion about whether Obama is a socialist, a Muslim, a Kenyan, a coward, inept, foolish, greedy, the Antichrist, or the best thing since sliced bread. If you are unhappy that the last two Presidential elections have failed to yield a POTUS to your liking, go down to the bar and complain to your pisos. This ain’t the place for that. It’s also not the place for extolling whatever virtues you might feel Obama brings to the office. I mention him only because it’s impossible to discuss something like an invasion of Estonia by Russia in a current events context without bringing the POTUS into it. I post a disclaimer now because several of our newer members seem to struggle with separating objective analysis of the military and strategic challenges that face the Commander-in-Chief from their impulse to editorialize regarding their perceptions of the personal shortcomings of the current POTUS.

In the event of a bolt-from-the-blue Russian conquest of Estonia, the POTUS becomes faced with some very difficult policy choices. I do believe he can’t possibly stand by and allow a member of NATO to be occupied. He’s got to do something to get the Russians out of Estonia. Even if the solution ends up being a negotiated agreement that causes the Russians to withdraw, such an agreement will be based on having the Russians believe that the US is psychologically and militarily prepared to spank them. It’s hard to see how said preparedness would not involve the movement of US heavy divisions to Europe.

The POTUS would have to decide right away whether he’s going to order SACEUR to put NATO air assets into combat over Estonia. On the surface, this seems like an easy decision to me. The sooner Putin understands that his occupation of Estonia will not go unchallenged, the greater the chance that negotiations will yield fruit without recourse to major ground combat. I say this with the caveat that heavy forces sufficient for the expulsion of the Russians from Estonia must be on-hand. However, putting NATO air assets into action over Estonia immediately can have a political and military cost. Decisions about whose air assets to use probably have to be made right away, and the results of the air actions will have a bearing on the political discussions in Washington and all of the other NATO capitols immediately following the breaking of the news.

SACEUR is going to want unambiguous guidance. He will say that if he puts a single aircraft over Estonia, then he’s going to want to put up a strike package capable of accomplishing something. What exactly does the President want accomplished at this juncture?

This is where it’s going to get tricky for the POTUS right away. Simply executing ground attack missions against Russian troops in Estonia makes a statement of intent. Personally, I wouldn’t mind this at all. If you send your troops across international borders, then you should expect the allies of the invaded country to conduct air strikes against your troops in the country at the bare minimum. Everyone in NATO should expect that the US will, at the very least, attack from the air enemy troops in the process of invading a member of NATO. Still, the act of attacking Russian ground forces in Estonia is a commitment. Such a commitment would embolden some and panic others.

For those here who are even less knowledgeable about air operations than I am, a quick review of a couple of items may be warranted. Normally, aircraft flying strike missions (close air support, interdiction, etc.) do not move to the target area by themselves when the enemy is in a position to contest control of the airspace above the target. It does happen. The Tornado was designed to fly through contested airspace at heights under 60 meters. This is called ultra-low penetration. The advantage of ultra-low penetration is that strike aircraft flying very fast and very, very low can exploit ground clutter to confuse look-down radar in the defender’s fighters and thus avoid interception. Ultra-low penetration also enables the strike aircraft to evade ground based radar and allow so little time for ground based air defenses to react. So the theory goes. Operation Desert Storm was the first opportunity of the RAF to put tactics designed for the Central Front through their paces. The tactics work, but they impose a high cost in aircraft.

If an air force wants to send strike aircraft into contested airspace without operating in the ultra-low penetration mode, and if the strike aircraft aren’t stealthy, then the air force puts together a strike package. The package typically includes strike aircraft, radar jamming aircraft, air defense suppression aircraft, and fighter escorts. This combination of aircraft enables the package to fight its way to the target and back. In such a package, the strike aircraft may comprise a small percentage of the package. Most of the airframes involved are assigned to fight enemy interceptors, defeat enemy radar, or destroy enemy ground based defenses. It takes a lot of aircraft to fight this way, which is why the European Allies designed the Tornado. There’s a connection with the development of the F-111, but I’m not knowledgeable enough to put the pieces together.

Then there is stealth. Stealthy aircraft get around the requirements of the strike package by being invisible.

When an air force establishes temporary and/or localized control over the airspace, that air force is said to have achieved air superiority. Strike packages operate under conditions of air superiority because often it is the escorting aircraft that create air superiority. Once an air force has near-total control of the airspace over most of its intended targets, that air force is said to enjoy air supremacy. Once air supremacy is achieved, strike aircraft can move to their targets unescorted.

All of this connects to the ground attack mission in support of Estonian forces.

I’m out of time again. I will have to come back another time.
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