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Old 04-27-2015, 05:34 PM
swaghauler swaghauler is offline
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Originally Posted by unkated View Post
I started having trouble with it in the beginning:

Opening Moves

"Despite the outbreak of hostilities between the US and USSR in Europe in 1996, the Pacific Rim started out as a relatively quiet area."


Um, Russia is fighting China in 1995 and makes no moves along the Pacific Coast? No attempts at blockade? Does nothing with their fleet units at Cam Rahn Bay?

In the 1990s, (in our timeline, anyway) the Chinese PLAN was beginning to expand. So was their air force, which would give them some force to push back. Sounds like an active War Zone.

None of the Western Powers do any counter moves? The JDF naval forces stay in port? The US Fleet stays east of the International Dateline?

No armed assurance of commerce missions in 1995? Consider what the western powers did during the 1980s during the Iran Iraq War to protect neutral shipping running through the Arabian Gulf; this would be to oppose the Soviet Union in a timeline where the Cold War did not end.

I would imagine that if nothing else, 1995-96 in the Pacific would be a period of increased tension - there is a major way going on, with western powers (US at least) want to ship in equipment and ammo, and it being in the Soviet interest to prevent it, preferably without triggering a 2-front war.

Then increase the tension from actual shooting in Europe.

OTOH, if the Soviets, under pressure form the West keep away from the China Coast, there's nothing really to prevent them from keeping a close watch on the few Soviet ports (which was done in the 1980s & 1990s anyway).

In either case, by 1996, when NATO does enter the fray in Europe, it does not seem to me like it would be "quiet." More like "primed to explode."



First Big Fight

I have trouble with the notion that a large surface (soviet) SAG could leave harbor in time of war much less get into gun or missile range without a lot of warning. It says that this fight takes place in deep water, but the Sea of Japan is rather limited in size (yes, three hundred miles is small when your missiles and planes have ranges that are 3-10 times that.

Submarines at 45 knots are a) deaf and b) quite noticeable - yes, even an Alfa and Akula. That they can move a distance, turn and fire a spread of torpedoes I can believe. That they can fire a targeted spread and hit a moving target that they did not see (guessing at its likely location) and that heard them coming with 4 of 8 (and hit other targets with any of the others) I cannot swallow.

Is the Carl Vinson group 6 hours ship travel time? (6x30 = 180 nm) That's well within its air envelope - either for protection or attack. Not to mention that off Korea is Japan, with a hitherto untouched US air force backed by JSDFAF.

So, I have some problems with both the strategic and tactical tenor of what I have read so far.

Uncle Ted
I have to agree with your assessment of the Pact's tactics. This is why I have always suggested in my posts that the USSR would sorte its fleet early in the conflict with China as commerce raiders. If NATO did take sides with the Chinese; Russia would want the fleet "at sea" when that happened. They were well aware of the technological edge NATO had after the 91 Gulf War. The best option for survival would be to "disperse" the fleet and force NATO to hunt for them. The Pact fleet was ideal for use as a commerce raiding force. Russian ships are fast and tend to have better fuel endurance than comparable NATO ships. They do not have the "detection range" of most NATO ships, nor do they carry a large number of reloads for their weapons. These two factors are major handicaps in a sustained naval engagement. The Russians would fare much better "running from" a NATO task force and hitting merchant shipping instead. You can, in theory, disable an entire task force (by denying it fuel) by simply sinking one commercial tanker. If NATO loses enough merchant shipping; you can stall a fairly large ground offensive too. The Russians would need "ports abroad" to rest and resupply from. This could draw Cuba, and certain South American and African countries into the conflict when NATO took steps to kill Pact raiders who were in these countries territorial waters. I also see many ships on both sides being "stranded" by a lack of fuel later in the conflict.
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