[Webstral]

I echo the sentiments of others that the debate here has retained a gentlemanly character. I expect that here, but my expectation should not diminish credit due.


I think we can generally agree that capacity is no guarantee of delivery. Mere possession of arms does not necessarily lead to a commitment to republican values by those possessing arms any more than mere possession of wealth leads to thrift or good investment habits. Possession of arms without responsibility of service is a[n Alexander] Hamiltonian idea that gained traction in the early 1800’s. The logic given at the time was that the yeomanry couldn’t be bothered with something so unprofitable as reserve service.


As with all things dependent on human psychology, the Framers worked with likelihoods. There’s no guarantee, for instance, that a given man will be able to stand his ground on the battlefield or execute his orders under fire. However, the United States Marine Corps has concluded that three months of Boot Camp executed in a certain fashion will yield a very high proportion of disciplined and cohesive new Marines. On balance, a regimen of discipline and training will yield troops superior to those who have not undergone such a regimen.


By the same token, a body of troops accustomed to taking orders from a popularly elected chief executive through the officers delegated his authority is more likely to retain a commitment to this republican modality than a body of troops who authority is derived from their own capacity for violence. Training and experience powerfully influence behavior on the battlefield.


The Civil War illustrates my point about the checks and balances built into a states’ militia and its potential for armed rebellion against the federal government. I’ll back up a bit and reiterate a couple of my earlier points. What follows is rather a rough draft and so will be a bit disjointed. I’ll try to close the loop by the end.


The State cannot guarantee the citizenry the right to access arms optimized for military operations against the State. It’s inconceivable. Individuals have the opportunity to seek redress through the courts. Larger groups have the opportunity to seek redress through the courts or through the legislature and executive by voting. These means of redress are adequate, according to the premises upon which the republic is based. Equipping individuals for alternative means of redress implies that the Framers did not believe in the ability of the republic to function as intended. Moreover, equipping individuals or small groups to seek redress of ills by means of arms makes a farce of the entire idea of representative government and the social contract associated with republicanism.


This much said, the State—in this case, the constitutional federal republic of the United States of America—can equip its citizenry to overthrow a successor state in the event the republic is transformed into a tyranny. In other words, the State cannot logically equip its citizens to overthrow it. The State may, however, equip its citizens to overthrow a successor State which may have replaced the republic. The logic for this is that the State exists, in part, to secure the rights of its citizenry. Those rights presumably exist whether the State is in effect or not. The State therefore is within its purview to equip its citizens to restore the republic for the purpose of defending their rights in the event that the republic ceases to function as a consequence of becoming a Tyranny.


How do we determine whether a successor state, which I will call a Tyranny, has replaced the State? That is up to the electorate through their legislature. If a majority of the legislature of the State of Franklin pass a bill declaring that the federal government has become a Tyranny and that Franklin shall no longer be bound to the federal government in its Tyrannical form, that bill becomes law in Franklin. The same is true of each and every other state.


This goes back to the militia in that the militia as defined in 1787 takes to the field on the orders of the state chief executive. The militia is funded a regulated by the legislature. The militia is the primary arm of the military of a small republic, many of which comprise the federal republic. While there is no ironclad guarantee that under every circumstance the militia will execute their orders from the governor, training, discipline, and habit are powerful forces.


A logic of probability applies. A force of reservists who are equipped with military grade small arms and who are properly drilled in their use is more likely to successfully combat opposing professionals than a force of non-regulars with military grade small arms or a force of reservists lacking military grade small arms. A militia organized and trained to fight under the command of an elected chief executive is more likely to continue taking orders under stress and confusion than a force of non-regulars unaccustomed to operating under the command of an elected chief executive. Militiamen fighting as the military arm of a small republic (a state) are more likely to fight to reinstate a fallen federal republic than armed citizens fighting for their perceived rights as distinct from the will of the electorate. Troops with unit cohesion and discipline derived from long experience together are more likely to prevail on the battlefield than troops without such unit cohesion and discipline. The same body is troops is more likely to retain its integrity following a reversal on the battlefield than troops lacking in unit cohesion and discipline. Trained and disciplined reservists are more likely to behave in a fashion befitting citizen-soldiers than any other body of non-regular troops; thus militiamen are less likely to turn to settling old scores in the event of a seismic shift in political or social stability than other types of armed civilians. While none of what I have written can be called certain, warfare offers no certainties. One deals in likelihoods.


Getting back to the issue of the militia versus the professional force, a rather elegant set of checks and balances exists. The federal government of the early United States possessed the means to combat one state but not the means to defeat a majority of states acting in concert. Within each state, the militia can be put into the field against federal forces under the command of the chief executive (using the authority derived from the electorate) based on a declaration by the legislature (using their authority derived from the electorate) that the State in its incarnation of a republic had become a Tyranny. A majority of legislators, presumably representing the will of a majority of the electorate, would be required to create the legal basis for the forces of the state to be used against the forces of the Tyranny.


Beyond the actions of a single state would be the decisions of a plurality of states. Systemic abuses of the rights of the citizenry might be perceived by the citizens of Franklin to be sufficient evidence that the republic had become a Tyranny. However, the citizens of Jefferson or Baja Arizona might not agree. In order for the various states to amass the combat power to overcome the professional forces of the federal government, the abuses by the Tyranny would have to be sufficiently systemic and widespread to arouse the citizens of a critical mass of states for enough militia combat power to take to the field successfully.


All of this goes back to the Civil War. As we all know, a number of states seceded from the Union. Their legislatures went through the necessary proceedings. Their militia took to the field. They captured federal troops and facilities within their borders. So far, so good.


It should be noted, however, that the goal of the Confederacy never was to replace the federal government. Secession serves as a frank admission that what the Confederates perceived as systemic abuses of the rights of the citizens (or, more precisely, the interests of the people who controlled the state legislatures in the Deep South) was not perceived the same way by the majority of the citizenry of the United States. The war that followed was the outcome of the failure of the Deep South to carry majority opinion regarding the abuses of their rights. Had the Northern states been in agreement with the Confederacy, the federal government would have been swept away. In a very real sense, then, the Civil War conformed precisely to the balance of power built into the states’ militia establishment. The superior industrialization of the North reinforced the decision of the majority that the federal government was not trampling on the rights of the citizenry.