[Ursus Maior]

Thank you for the input and for sharing your ideas with us. I was wondering the same, though I have not, for now, come up with ideas that satisfy my understanding of the 1990s. My main critique with your points 1) and 2) is that the lack of a collapsing USSR and the (historically) desolate state of it in 1991 under your assumptions would have led to less vigilance and strength than historically, but a stronger USSR. That seems at least counter-intuitive to me.

Historically the dissolution of the USSR was something no-one expected to happen. It lead to a collapse of the military forces of Russia and the other successor states, but also billions of financial aid by Western countries. The former Eastern Bloc states were not integrated into NATO until the late 90s and into the EU until 2004 (Finland joined in 1995, but was not an Eastern Bloc nation). While we do not know about EU enlargement in FL's timeline, former Warsaw Pact countries were not admitted to NATO in that timeline. Because of that, a larger financial drain than happened historically is not likely.

Germany is a special case of course. Though, given the historical financial drain and the massive demobilization process that came with the complete elimination of GDR forces and equipment and the down-scaling of the active army as well as large parts of the territorial army (the latter was hit war worse than the actual field army), I do not see a heavier drain on FL's version of the Bundeswehr. Actually, that is quite unlikely, given the clear and present danger the USSR would still have played in FL's 1990s.

Maybe we should look at what makes the USSR such a formidable foe, instead of specific, as of yet not hinted to, weaknesses on NATO's side. With the Gang of Eight taking control and Gennady Yanayev dying under mysterious circumstances, one might think of internal strife or even struggle's for power and "active methods of consolidation" by surviving members of the junta. This reeks of a, maybe short but pronounced, period of internal cleansing, state terrorism and a generally shorter leash. Keeping some forms of liberalization, like small private businesses, but tightening the grip on the big state industry.

The nascent oligarchs of 1990/1991 might have to make the choice of falling in line or mysteriously dying, too, much earlier than in our history. Propaganda trials against "counter-revolutionary capitalists" and "imperialist agents" (i. e. uncovered NATO spies or their goons) might have been the only signs to the West that the USSR was trying to stay alive and using old methods. Other than that, freedom of press would have been reduced to levels not seen since 1968 and the Iron Curtain would have been simply moved back a little.

With the oligarchs never coming into being properly, the large sell-out of the Soviet economy does not happen. Since no republics, except the Baltics, leave the USSR, its industry and economy does not get torn up. This softens the blow to living standards, health care and, foremost, tax revenue, allowing for comparatively huge investments into the armed forces when compared to known history. This is basically what happened from 2000 onward under President Putin, but it saves the population ten years of grief and the economy the same time of total collapse and brain-drain from bright minded individuals and large swathes of the labour force to emigrate, drink themselves to death or simply being unemployed.

Avoiding the historical collapse would be the single most important factor in the USSR remaining a credible opponent. It does not, however, let the USSR actively close the huge gap in military prowess that existed by 1990 already. It merely saves it from total, historical downfall. But while the West will still move forward, avoiding collapse might still mean stagnation and thus (effectively) falling behind even more. That fact will be hard to compensate or write away by any publisher.

However, a few years after Desert Storm, the oil prices spike in 1994 and the USSR gets a huge increase in revenue, basically for free. This money can be spent on internal security, military hardware and further reforms. This is the first actual leap forward the USSR might be able to enjoy and since it comes right at the point when historical down-scaling in the West comes into full effect: Clinton is president for one year, all East German forces have been dissolved, the personnel of the Bundeswehr is reduced to ca. 360,000 soldiers (130,000 less than 1989), NATO forces have begun moving out of Central Europe for good.

Now, as mentioned, it's questionable all this will happen exactly the way it used to happen, especially, if NATO sniffs any huge sums of money being invested into the armed forces of the USSR. But if the Soviets play their hand well, they might look pretty weak and of course T2K NATO cannot know what "alternate history" it missed, when the August Coup succeeded. So scaling down will be the law of the land.

The USSR, of course, will have to deal with Chechnya, Nagorny-Karabakh and Transnistria (even, if Moldavia did non secede, though: did it?). However, these brush wars will give the armed forces a clear mission to safeguard the Union and it will give the KGB a chance to keep the army occupied. Also, new tactics and weapon systems can be tried out, the trauma of Afghanistan overcome and experience be won. This experience is something NATO will lack, at least as a cohesive structure, though parts of it will, of course, have participated in Desert Storm and peacekeeping the Balkans. That is not the same, though: The Gulf War might have led to overconfidence, I agree there, as we saw, when the USAF lost a F-117 Nighthawk over Serbia, because the F-117s used the same routes multiple times.

Do that against a near-peer enemy in the early days of "punitive air-strikes against an aggressor attacking a friendly, but neutral nation, and you might get eviscerated quickly. Though the obvious question would be, if NATO would treat the Soviet Army, that just surprise attacked Poland, treat like Serbia in 1999? I doubt this clear lack of military professionalism and I doubt even more it would happen more than once. Though one big screw-up might give the Soviets a sufficient edge for the initial clash.

My biggest problem here is that as per FL's timeline, the Soviet Union attacks Poland in a similar manner as it did attack the Ukraine in 2014 or Georgia in 2008: deception, propaganda warfare, instigation of riots and then an offensive thinly veiled as peacekeeping mission. The US answer that by conducting "a broad air bombing campaign against the advancing Soviet forces with stealth aircraft and cruise missiles". That's a unilateral approach by the USA which is stupid, but plays into the hands of the USSR: Poland is backed by a US air campaign, but there are no other belligerents. Now the USSR does the most idiotic thing it could do: It rips of it carefully donned mask of "coming in peace" and strikes against US installations in Germany, Turkey and the UK, triggering NATO Article 5; mutual defense. In order for that to make sense, there must have been a plan, even if it was dumb.

To put this into perspective, this is like Germany getting away with laying hands on Czechoslovakia in 1938 (equivalent to the USSR annexing the Baltic States), then attacking Poland and when France and the UK declare war, going on a killing spree against every other nation in Europe and America, drawing everybody into a war already in 1939. Why would the USSR do that? What's the plan here? By comparison, in Red Storm Rising the USSR starts a conventional war against NATO as a feint attack to have free hands in seizing Middle-Eastern oilfields. It's not a great plan and it fails, but it's a plan.

So, why would the USSR draw NATO into a war that until then had "only" been a punitive air-campaign by the USA and a ground-warfare campaign the Soviets certainly were winning. If the USSR had wanted a surprise attack against its former Bloc allies, strategic surprise could have been achieved better before NATO got involved than afterwards. But if it was not about Central or Eastern Europe, what is the goal of this war? A Clancyesque war for oil? Plundering Europe for revenue? Defense under the impression of an imminent attack?

I think that question needs an answer, before we can ask what went wrong on both sides. The question of the weakness of NATO is important, but it is likely connected to the reason of the war.