Ok, here's my amateur interpretation of where things currently stand:
The Russian Army is in some state of partial collapse, having abandoned the attack of Kiev and failing to make substantive advances ont he ground in weeks. Stockpiles of precision guided munitions have been largely depleted, the Ural tank plant has stopped production and the 135,000 conscripts called up last week will take months to be trained and formed into effective combat units. Nontraditional sources of reinforcements (Wagner group mercs, 16,000 Syrian veterans and various Chechen private armies) are unlikely to arrive in sufficient mass and be able to integrate effectively into the Russian armed forces to effect the outcome. Byelorussian units are unlikely to intervene on Russia's behalf. The Russian military itself is scraping the bottom to the barrel for combat troops, having denuded the Pacific Fleet of Marines, for example.
The Ukrainians are likely to follow/drive the Russians back to the Byelorussian border in the north. Mariupol is probably lost, the Russians control about 85% of it. The Russian units retreating from the Kiev front are likely to be re-commited in the Donbas region, or at least allow a shuffle of uncommited units (if any exist) to the Donbas. The Russian hope is that the influx of troops there will shore up the front line enough to resist the coming Ukrainian counterattack. To limit the scope of the counterattack the Russians are trying to tie down as many Ukrainian troops as they can in other areas, launching diversionary attacks in Odessa and Kharkov to prevent the Ukrainian command from stripping those areas of troops to reinforce the counterattack.
Russian control of occupied areas is tenuous, with repeated anti-occupation protests in the only city they have occupied, Kherson. The Russians lack sufficient troops to secure these areas, and attempts to recruit local sympathizers to assume administrative duties has failed as heavy-handed kidnappings of local government officials feeds civilian resistance. Russian attacks on semi-beseiged cities and civilian facilities (shelters, schools, hospitals, apartment buildings) is intended to terrorize the Ukrainain population and destroy civilian morale, creating pressure on the Ukrainian government to sue for peace.
The Ukrainian military is still smaller and limited in its abilities, although with very high morale. Allied aid has allowed them to prevail in the defensive battles and the government has a deep potential manpower pool. (They are currently only calling up veterans with combat experience since 2014, although accepting volunteers with less experience). The amount of training required for the Ukrainians to be outfitted with advanced non-Soviet equipment will be prohibitive - Stinger missiles can be used effectively with a few days of instruction, Patriots will require months of training, and NATO has largely retired the masses of equipment required for Ukraine to hastily form combined arms mechanized units.
Going forward, on the battlefield my personal estimation is that the Russians will struggle to make any further territorial gains. The level of additional troops and their effectiveness that can be thrown in Donbas will effect how successful the Ukrainians are in recapturing that territory, although the Ukrainian drive will be largely of a light infantry/partisan nature, infiltrating behind Russian combat units and cutting them and their supporting logistic coumns to pieces in small packets. The Russians will continue to use whatever long-range munitions they have left to attack targets throughout the depth of Ukraine, but those attacks will continue to have little strategic effect other than unifying Ukrainians in the will to fight and keeping Western publics pressuring their governments to continue supporting Ukraine (hence Zelensky's address to parlianments around the world and Grammy awards message).
Which brings us to where the war goes strategically going forward. I'm confident that the only meeting Putin will accept with Zelensky is to accept Zelensky's surrender. Not going to happen. The Russian propaganda machine has already recast the war goals from demilitarization and denazifaction of Ukraine - regime change - down to expansion of the separatist puppet states. The possibility of continued failue by the Russian military on the ground puts even this objective in doubt. The Ukrainians soon will be able go to the peace talks offering recognition of Russian control of Crimea and Donbas and a pledge to memorialize NATO non-membership and probably get Russian acceptance. (By the way, regime change in Moscow in the short term is probably not going to happen... the oligarchs are able to hide their money from Western sanctions, the urban middle class is fleeing and too small to effect a change and the 50% of the population in the regions and rural areas are too willing consumers of state propaganda to rise up against Putin. Now, in a year or two when the defeated Army is back home, please see 1905 and 1917!) Zelensky has to choose how to move forward in war termination... 1) seek a more or less immediate ceasefire, accepting the loss of territory in Crimea and Donbas, ending the bloodshed and leaving open a "frozen conflict" like the ones in South Osetia, Transdnistr and Nagorno-Karabakh, or 2) take the risk that the Russian miltiary collapse will continue and his forces will be able retake not only the territory they lost in the last 2 months but also the Donbas separatist regions without provoking a Russian escalation.
Fairly high-level and simplified, but that's where I think things stand now! I'm happy to hear your thoughts!
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I love the smell of napalm in the morning. You know, one time we had a hill bombed, for 12 hours. When it was all over, I walked up. We didn't find one of 'em, not one stinkin' body. The smell, you know that gasoline smell, the whole hill. Smelled like... victory. Someday this war's gonna end...
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