Quote:
Originally Posted by castlebravo92
Logistically, they ran out of gas 100 km in (which, anecdotally, was one of my friend's experience with Russian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia - they were always running out of gas and having to be rescued). Apparently their plan was for their Spetsnaz teams to take out Zelensky, their armored columns would roll down the highway on a Sunday stroll and refuel at gas stations along the way, and that would be that. And there was no plan B.
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The absurd thing is that this has been known to be their limit for ages. The Soviet army was as much dependent on railways as the Russian is now. Of course, they had more trucks, but in the end, this has been their Achilles heel since Word War Two.
What's new, or let's say: what's more extreme than during the 1980s, is the rampant corruption and the mistrust Putin and his Kremlin junta have in the armed forces. Apparently, the WaPo article above reiterates that well, front line troops were made believe they went into their attack positions for an exercise. As is common in the armed forces of Russia, this meant, they sold off every drip of extra fuel and all extra supplies they were handed on the black market. Then, when they got the order to invade, which only happened on the day of the invasion (!!!) or the night before, they were already tight on fuel, food and spare parts.
Let's not kid ourselves: This alone makes such an endeavor impossible. Even the US and their coalition forces would have had much more difficulties beating Iraq in 2003 (or 1991 for that matter) had they gone in with - let's say - 50 percent POL, food and spare parts than 100 percent or 125 percent. Now, add to that all other Russian problems, logistical limits to around 100 km off the last railhead, bad leadership, unprepared troops, faulty tires from cheap Chinese suppliers and of course: a determined defender, and this absolutely has to end in a disaster.
Also, Russia had - as mentioned - not cared to develop a Plan B. Going into a country of 40 million people with less than 200.000 troops can only work, if you manage that decapitation strike. Otherwise, countries of that size and population, especially concentrated into huge cities, need millions of troops, not hundreds of thousands. The German Wehrmacht went for Kyiv with 544,000 men in 1941 and that attack was separate from the thrust along the coastline of the Black Sea, which was largely conducted y 14 Romanian divisions and supported by the German 11th Army (Operation München) for a further total of more than 325,000 men. And still the Axis forces lost upwards of 100,000 men between late June (start of Operation Barbarossa) and late September.