[Ursus Maior]

I concur with the RUSI analysis being a good blueprint for T2K with some caveats: First of all, I think the Soviet Army (and, depending on the timeline/edtion used: its allies) would have to fare a lot better in initial attacks on Western forces than the Russian Armed Forces did during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Eventually, however, Soviet forces would be depleted as much as Russian forces are and when this bough breaks, Soviet solutions to the operational situation will look similar to Russian ones. I also think, the authors of the game have anticipated some of these solutions fairly well.

First, force generation will resort to mobilization, but it probably would not be full or even total mobilization in the beginning, because that would tank the industry. With no Western allies providing food, ammunition and transport vehicles via lend & lease, the USSR needs to come up with these resources on its own. That limits how many men it can take out of the labor force. But mobilization will creep up eventually, partially because it's bound to happen and partially because alternate sources will run dry. These alternate sources are international volunteers, a limited resource, given that many parts of the world are aflame at the same time, and prison populations.

Generation of war materiel will fare similarly, I presume. We all know of the hodgepodge of vehicles in T2K, the constant downgrading of planned inventories for a unit given. One just has to look at the development of Wehrmacht divisions from 1939 to 1945: the final waves of deployment were hardly recognizable from an early war point of view. What is also likely is that local workshops near the front would set up production, delivering much needed support weapons and mobility solutions. While a local shop cannot produce field guns, cannons or howitzers, let alone ATGMs, mortars and recoilless rifles are much easier to manufacture with primitive tools, as are first generation assault/battle rifles and submachine guns. For mobility, carts - both hand and animal drawn - are easily constructed as are bicycles.

All in all, Soviet solutions might look similar to Russia solutions today on the tactical level, because operational and strategic possibilities and solutions will dictate certain developments. However, with key components of today's Ukrainian solutions and developments missing, counter batter radar, artillery outranging Russian guns and drones aka tactical and operational real time aerial reconnaissance missing, some developments will not take place. The Soviet army of 1997-2000 will not have to worry (or at least far less) loosing troops and assets in its rear area to long range strikes. This will enable the Soviets (but also the Western allies) to set up cantonments for regiments/brigades upwards and dispatch individual (augmented) companies to the frontline (i. e. into artillery ranges) with the cantonments in villages or towns no more than 30 km from the respective FLOT. This makes transits to and from the front possible without motorization, i. e. per bicycle, horse, cart or even on foot. Between FLOT and division cantonment a battalion HQ will provide C² in the assembly area, about 5-15 km from FLOT.

Also, with aerial reconnaissance playing almost no roll, the ratio of indirect rounds fired and infantry killed (especially in massed attacks) will look very different. Additionally, scouting ahead of small unit assaults and raids will have a more conventional look with LRRP becoming an important asset for all units battalion size and up. Often lacking radios, information will flow extremely slowly, with no reinforcements or "cavalry to the rescue" available if a patrol comes under fire. The former will mean that along static front lines infantry can move unprotected, but once in sight and range of the enemy, these troops will fare the same as in World War One: water cooled machine guns and mortars being available en masse. The difficulty of generating reliable intelligence on the enemy, especially behind FLET will maximize the fog of war, making all assets of aerial reconnaissance (IMINT) as well as HUMINT and SIGINT forms extremely valuable. To be clear on that: The front lines in Poland might be as static as the Western front in parts, but commanders will have less reconnaissance available to themselves than their counterparts in France in Belgium 80 years earlier.

This would a) make offensives much more riskier to conduct and b) would necessitate reconnaissance by force much more often, depleting relevant and highly specialized units much more quickly than previously. This might be the most important reason, why we only get about one offensive per side per year: Readying personnel, materiel, logistics and especially one's intelligence picture would be too much a task to conduct more than once, especially after the nuclear attacks devastating most industries, population centers and critical infrastructure.

The NATO attack of Operation Reset probably had a fairly good picture of the next 100-200 km of enemy positions, but had the misfortune of running into a Soviet offensive force just having finished preparations for their own offensive.