and now one on the State Guards:
Thoughts on the State Guards in US
As Flamingo noted, local draft boards directed those found unfit for military service for family or mild medical reasons (dietary restrictions, color blindness and the like) to join local state guard units. The federal government planned, in the fall of 1996 (following the initiation of REFORGER, general mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves and the determination to expand the Army) to provide limited support to state guard units, as it became available.
In many places the State Guards had an existing but woefully undermanned structure. Composed of volunteers, equipment and training standards varied but were generally poor. The Federal Government authorized state governors to call back to active duty, using federal funds, retired National Guardsmen, under age 60, who were fit for duty but ineligible for overseas deployment to act as cadre and trainers for expanding State Guard units. In addition, State Guards were provided with limited material support from the Army – surplus steel helmets from warehouses around the U.S., M-1 and M-14 rifles (M-14s were issued to units in Alaska and Hawaii and units that had a beach patrol or port security role) and CUCV pick-up trucks and utility vehicles turned in by National Guard units upgrading to HMMWVs prior to deployment.
The retirees, many of who had served for many years together in the insular world of a single state’s National Guard, formed a solid backbone for the State Guards. The administration, logistics and operational planning of State Guard units in the first half of 1997 were superb thanks to the experienced NCOs and field grade officers filling the staffs of State Guard battalions and regiments.
Members were expected to report for training two weekends a month (after an initial training, generally lasting two weeks, conducted at Job Corps or juvenile delinquent boot camp facilities). Training facilities and materials were generally scarce, as the National Guard was exerting maximum effort to deploy combat units overseas and had few resources to spare. Funds were often short to pay guardsmen for their attendance, and absenteeism was high as a result (in addition to the difficulties imposed by spending so many weekends away from home). Training focused on individual skills such as marksmanship and first aid, riot control and civil defense/disaster relief.
At the state level planning for State Guard units envisioned missions guarding National Guard armories and facilities, critical infrastructure (power plants, railroad yards full of war material, ports, refineries and major defense plants) and state buildings, performing disaster relief missions normally undertaken by National Guard units, and assisting the State Police and FEMA in execution of urban evacuation plans. Primary responsibility for execution of the security and disaster relief missions shifted to SGUS units as National Guard units were called to federal service.
Despite the high quality of the staff, the actual conduct of operations was spotty. Many of the recruits referred to the State Guards were unfit for service or generally reluctant to serve. The quantity of new recruits referred to the State Guards far exceeded the organization’s ability to evaluate, train and absorb. Much effort was wasted screening out the criminal, addicted and unsuitable. Organizations were in constant turmoil as new recruits reported and had to be absorbed and given further training while units were actively undertaking operational missions. While there was a solid cadre of mid and high grade NCOs and officers in the recalled retirees, there was a dearth of lower grade NCOs and officers to execute the plans developed by the staffs (who were themselves of only marginal ability to operate in the field).
The final limitation of the SGUS units was their limited size. In a climate of paranoia fed by the war (and heightened by the operations early in the war of Spetsnaz units operating out of the Soviet diplomatic missions in the U.S. or slipped across the Mexican border) there was vast demand for State Guard troops to provide guard forces for universities, grain elevators and state parks (in addition to the critical infrastructure identified above). The result was usually consternation when guard leaders turned down the most outrageous requests or dilution of effort to such an extent that the State Guard’s presence was purely for effect - a pair of guardsmen guarding a power plant rather than the company-sized element required to do the job correctly. This failing showed clearly in the evacuation scares that occurred throughout late 1996 and 1997, when disorderly crowds of city dwellers nearly overran bus and train stations and the roads became hopelessly clogged with cars fleeing cities, each potentially the target of a no-warning Soviet nuclear strike. The State Guards were simply outnumbered by panicked civilians and their effectiveness depended on calm, cooperative and orderly evacuees, a tragically uncommon commodity.
Morale of the State Guards suffered as the war went on. The enthusiastic prewar volunteers that remained (many of the fit volunteered for active military service) were promoted to leadership positions, and bereft of decent leadership training, had a tendency to lord over the “drafteesâ€. The late pay, frequent training sessions and lack of adequate material and facilities drove morale down. Issuing Second World War vintage M-1 rifles to guardsmen was perceived as an indication that their expected contribution was so low that issuing modern rifles were a waste. The fiasco of the early evacuation scares (especially the one that followed the initiation of tactical nuclear warfare overseas in the hot summer of 1997) drove morale down even further as guardsmen saw their ineffectiveness (and the danger involved in trying to control a panicked mob with a handful of guardsmen – with over two dozen instances of small detachments of guardsmen being overrun, injured and even killed during the July 1997 evacuation scare alone).
The low morale and perception of ineffectiveness drove absenteeism up as 1997 grew later. Guardsmen were expected not only to report for training two weekends a month but to report for regularly scheduled security duties (usually a week each month) and to be available for additional callups (such as for evacuations and disaster relief duties). As absenteeism grew the remaining members were tasked with more duties in a rapidly accelerating downward spiral.
Naturally, the nuclear attacks on CONUS changed the SGUS dramatically. All of the early war plans for multiple missions were to be immediately implemented. In the days and weeks following the Thanksgiving Day Massacre, FEMA and state governors ordered the evacuation of all cities over 500,000 with potential targets. The massive evacuation was to be undertaken by bus convoys or trains, with private cars left at home, escorted by State policemen and guardsmen. Security details for existing critical locations were to be maintained (despite their status as possible nuclear targets). Simultaneously, guardsmen were to establish security over food storage and distribution sites and assist state police and local authorities with maintaining public order. Some detachments were tasked to provide security for semi-isolated National Guard headquarters installations (such as Camp Fretterd, MD, Camp Shelby, MS and Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA) that also served as state government evacuation sites.
In general, SGUS units met one of three fates in the aftermath of the nuclear strikes on the Untied States. First, many units were overrun or disintegrated in the chaos that followed the nuclear strikes. An example of this is the Manhattan Battalion of the New York Militia, which had but 500 troops to evacuate the over 1.5 million residents of the island. The fifteen guardsmen responsible for maintaining the orderly loading of eight platforms of passenger trains in Penn Station were killed by the mob within two hours of the issuance of the evacuation order, and the remainder simply drifted away. Likewise, a detachment of guardsmen escorting a convoy of school busses from New Orleans was wiped out in an ambush outside Opelousas, Louisiana by locals who objected to further refugees (mostly ethnic minorities) being relocated to the small town. The second fate of SGUS unties was that they remained intact but abandoned their assigned duties. Faced with impossible demands for numerous missions, the commanders decided to use their resources for self-preservation. In several cases, guardsmen evacuated their families using SGUS materials and authority and established themselves as guard forces for refugee camps or relocation sites upon their arrival. Finally, a number of units remained loyal to surviving legal authorities. These were usually units in close contact with state governments (especially units guarding remote evacuation sites). A key factor in these units’ survival and continued effectiveness was their location outside major urban areas and reserves of material or extensive prior preparation.
Following the general breakdown of law in order in the United States in 1998 and 1999, SGUS units evolved in several ways. Many local militias (and marauder bands) formed around small detachments of guardsmen (the marauders often formed when evacuees resorted to force to secure adequate supplies of food and fuel from host communities). Others, after seeing to the safety of their families and local cantonments, sought out surviving legal authorities and made part of their forces (those not required for local security) available to state governments. In areas where federal troops were active, many guardsmen were incorporated into federal units, the legal restriction from deployment outside the home state either irrelevant or ignored. Finally, units that had provided protection to surviving state governments (such as in New Jersey and Vermont) formed the core for those state’s reconstruction and recovery efforts from 2000 onward.