[Webstral]

One of the important unanswered questions is how the Pact is handling reinforcing Pact ground forces in Germany. When I wrote Storm in Germany ages ago, I envisioned a combination of more-or-less complete formations moving forward as well as masses of men from other divisions sent forward as replacements. In keeping with the Soviet doctrine of fighting a division until it was combat ineffective (30-50%), then withdrawing it for reconstitution with replacement men and machines, the formations of GSFG would be rotated through reconstitution centers behind the line. It’s hard to say how many fresh Soviet divisions would have been moved into East Germany during the fighting in Oct-Nov 96, other than the handful mentioned in the v1 chronology.

By the same token, it’s hard to say how many Polish formations would have been involved. (I don’t have the Eastern Europe Sourcebook, which I suspect details such things.) The same question of fresh formations v reconstituted formations comes into play, though. I’m very much inclined to think that the Soviets would have fed replacements into the formations in combat at the best possible rate while assembling intact divisions in the operational rear for a counterstroke once the West Germans had been fought to a standstill. It’s possible that this counterstroke was underway when the Anglo-Americans got involved.

There’s also the question of what was going on between the time the first US Army formation crossed the border and the first combat action between US and Pact forces. 11th ACR claims this honor, having crossed the border on 12/02 and started fighting on 12/05. By the time the first American combat unit entered East Germany, there would be no more question in the minds of the Soviets that the US was entering the ring, so to speak. So what happened in the air?

In my mind, leading up to the Anglo-American involvement there was an agreement of some sort that defined a Pact ability to hit targets in West Germany germane to the war effort free from NATO interference. After all, if the war was a West German coup de main, then the West Germans should be available for Pact counteraction. It would be hard for the US to defend the airspace above West German air bases while claiming to be on the sidelines.

As a result, there probably would have been regular attacks by the SAF and its allied against West German targets. NATO air defenses would have tracked them, of course. It goes without saying that all targeting data would have been transmitted to the West Germans in real time. The inbound Pact strike craft would have had USAF/RAF escorts to ensure that there were no attempts to hit non-German NATO targets. Over the course of nearly two months of war, the Pact would have become habituated to being tracked and escorted en route to their targets in West Germany.

At the right moment, the USAF and RAF would have bushwhacked the Pact. The escorts would have opened up on the communist fliers in a sort of Red Pearl Harbor. Of course, some sort of provocation would have to be fabricated ahead of time. This would not be hard. Essentially, though, the story would be that the Soviets violated the agreement, leading to the NATO air defenses destroying all hostile aircraft in West German airspace. A quick 100-200 victories later, the USAF begins its German version of Operation Desert Storm. During the interim between 12/01 and 12/05, two US Army corps move up to the start lines with their armored cavalry regiments in the lead. The Pact forces in East Germany, having relaxed their guard a bit against air attack as a result of the destruction of the Luftwaffe and sheer exhaustion, would be superb targets during the first couple of hours of the Anglo-American air offensive. After 4-6 days of softening, the American first echelon goes in.

Where the Pact forces are at this point is an excellent question.